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Abstract
This paper shows that in suitable markets, even with out-of-equilibrium trade allowed, a
simple price update rule leads to rapid convergence toward the equilibrium. In particular, this
paper considers a Fisher market repeated over an unbounded number of time steps, with the
addition of finite sized warehouses to enable non-equilibrium trade.
The main result is that suitable tatonnement style price updates lead to convergence in a
significant subset of markets satisfying the Weak Gross Substitutes property. Throughout this
process the warehouse are always able to store or meet demand imbalances (the needed capacity
depends on the initial imbalances).
Our price update rule is robust in a variety of regards:
• The updates for each good depend only on information about that good (its current price,
its excess demand since its last update) and occur asynchronously from updates to other
prices.
• The process is resilient to error in the excess demand data.
• Likewise, the process is resilient to discreteness, i.e. a limit to divisibility, both of goods
and money.
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Lisa Fleischer was supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0515127, CCF-0728869 and CCF-1016778; the work of
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates when a tatonnement-style price update in a dynamic market setting could
lead to fast convergent behavior.
The impetus for this work comes from the following question: why might well-functioning
markets be able to stay at or near equilibrium prices? This raises two issues: what are plausible
price adjustment mechanisms and in what types of markets are they effective?
This question was considered by Walras in 1874, when he suggested that prices adjust by
tatonnement: upward if there is too much demand and downward if too little [51]. Since then,
the study of market equilibria, their existence, stability, and their computation has received much
attention in Economics, Operations Research, and most recently in Computer Science. McKen-
zie [33] gives a fairly recent account of the classic perspective in economics. The recent activity
in Computer Science has led to a considerable number of polynomial time algorithms for finding
approximate and exact equilibria in a variety of markets with divisible goods; we cite a selection of
these works [8, 9, 14, 16, 15, 22, 27, 38, 49, 50]. However, these algorithms do not seek to, and do
not appear to provide methods that might plausibly explain these markets’ behavior.
We argue here for the relevance of this question from a computer science perspective. Much
justification for looking at the market problem in computer science stems from the following argu-
ment: If economic models and statements about equilibrium and convergence are to make sense
as being realizable in economies, then they should be concepts that are computationally tractable.
Our viewpoint is that it is not enough to show that the problems are computationally tractable;
it is also necessary to show that they are tractable in a model that might capture how a market
works. It seems implausible that markets with many interacting players (buyers, sellers, traders)
would perform overt global computations, using global information.
Analogous goals have arisen when considering convergence to equilibria in game theory. Perhaps
the most successful approach has been to use regret minimizing procedures, which has yielded
convergence in several settings [40, 30, 17, 6]. Other works have considered best response [19, 37]
and proportional response dynamics [52].
A central concern with the tatonnement model of price updates, and other models, is whether
they cause prices to converge to equilibria. Such results were shown for some types of markets; early
examples include [1, 2, 36, 47]. However, there is no demonstration that these proposed update
models converge reasonably quickly. Indeed, without care in the specific details, they will not.1
It has long been recognized that the tatonnement price adjustment model is far from a realistic
model: for example, in 1972, Fisher [21] wrote “such a model of price adjustment · · · describes
nobody’s actual behavior.” This has led to to work on other price dynamics ranging from the Hahn
process [21] to non-equilibrium dynamics in the trading post model [45, 4], and others [12]. At the
same time, there has been a continued interest in the plausibility of tatonnement, and indeed its
predictive accuracy in a non-equilibrium trade setting has been shown in some experiments [26].
Plausibly, in many consumer markets buyers are myopic: based on the current prices, goods are
assessed on a take it or leave it basis. It seems natural that this would lead to out of equilibrium
trade. This is the type of setting in which we wish to consider our main question: under what
conditions can tatonnement style price updates lead to convergence?
Accordingly, in this paper we propose a simple market model in which the market extends over
1Of the referenced papers, only one formalization [47] is a discrete algorithm, and, as we make more specific later,
it may not converge quickly.
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time and trading occurs out of equilibrium (as well as at equilibrium). We call this the Ongoing
Market. Here, the market repeats from one time unit to the next; we call the basic unit a day. The
link from one day to the next is that goods unsold one day are available the next day, in addition
to the new supply, which for simplicity, we take as being the same from day to day. This appears
to provide a simple and natural way of allowing out-of-equilibrium trade. The algorithmic task is
to converge to equilibrium prices while clearing unsold stocks. We use the version of tatonnment in
which price updates are proportional both to the current price and to the excess demand (modulo
some minor details to prevent very large price changes). We show that it results in rapid convergence
toward equilibrium prices in this market.
Our analysis of the algorithm for the Ongoing Market relies in part on understanding which
we develop by analyzing convergence in the traditional market problem (used in the auctioneer
model for example). In this paper, we call this the One-Time Market. The algorithmic technique
of iteratively computing prices for the One-Time Market can be seen as a plausible approximation
to the Ongoing Market (but with no carry over of unsold goods). Our work can be seen as a
formal justification for this approach. Further, in our opinion, the intuitive understanding that
markets are usually similar from one time period to the next has been a factor in the previous
appeal of iterative price update algorithms, including, in the Computer Science literature, the
recent tatonnement algorithm of Codenotti et al. [8] and the auction algorithms of Garg et al. [22].
Our proposed price update protocols capture some of the characteristics of trading as proposed
in the trading post model [4], features that are lacking from previous algorithms subject to asymp-
totic analysis. Namely, our algorithm consists of price updates satisfying the following criteria:
the price update for a good depends only on the price, demand, and supply for that good, and
on no other information about the market; in addition, the price update for each good occurs dis-
tributively and asynchronously (i.e. at independent times). Further desirable features are that: the
algorithm can start with an arbitrary set of prices; the algorithm tolerates inaccuracy in demand
data; finally, it can tolerate discreteness: the fact that neither goods nor money are infinitely divis-
ible. We show that our update protocols converge quickly in many markets that satisfy the weak
gross substitutes property. In the process, we identify several natural parameters characterizing
these markets, parameters which govern the rate of convergence.
1.1 The Market Problems
The One-Time Fisher Market2 A market comprises a set of goods G, with |G| = n, and two
sets of agents, buyers B, with |B| = m, and sellers S. The sellers bring the goods G to market and
the buyers bring money with which to buy them. The trade is driven by a collection of prices pi for
good i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For simplicity, we assume that there is a distinct seller for each good; further it
suffices to have one seller per good. The seller of good i brings a supply wi of this good to market.
Each seller seeks to sell its goods for money at the prices pi.
Each buyer bj ∈ B comes to market with money vj; buyer bj has a utility function uj(x1j , · · · , xnj)
expressing its preferences: if bj prefers a basket with xij units (possibly a real number) of good i,
to the basket with yij units, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ul(x1j , · · · , xnj) > uj(y1j , · · · , ynj). Each buyer bj
intends to buy goods so as to achieve a personal optimal combination (basket) of goods given their
available money.
2The market we describe here is often referred to as the Fisher market. We use a different term because we
consider this problem in a new Ongoing Market model as described below.
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Prices p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) are said to provide an equilibrium if, in addition, the demand for
each good is bounded by the supply:
∑m
j=1 xij ≤ wi, and the total cost of the goods is bounded by
the available money:
∑
i piwi ≤
∑
j vj . The market problem is to find equilibrium prices.
3
The Fisher market is a special case of the more general Exchange market or Arrow-Debreu
market.
While we define the market in terms of a set of buyers B, all that matters for our algorithms is
the aggregate demand these buyers generate, so we will tend to focus on properties of the aggregate
demand rather than properties of individual buyers’ demands. This will prove significant when we
consider the case of (somewhat) indivisible goods.
Standard notation xi =
∑
l xil is the demand for good i, and zi = xi −wi is the excess demand
for good i (which can be positive or negative). Note that while w is part of the specification of the
market, x and z are functions of the vector of prices as determined by individual buyers maximizing
their utility functions given their available money. We will assume that xi is a function of the prices
p, that is a set of prices induce unique demands for each good.
The Ongoing Fisher Market In order to have non-equilibrium trade, we need a way to allocate
excess supply and demand. To this end, we suppose that for each good there is a warehouse which
can store excess demand and meet excess supply. The seller has a warehouse of finite capacity
to enable it to cope with fluctuations in demand. It will change prices as needed to ensure its
warehouse neither overfills nor runs out of goods.
The market consists of a set G of n goods and a set B of m buyers. The market repeats over
an unbounded number of time intervals called days. Each day, the seller of good i (called seller
i) receives wi new units of good i, and buyer ℓ is given vℓ money, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ m. As before, each
buyer ℓ has a utility function uℓ(x1ℓ, · · · , xnℓ) expressing its preferences. Each day, buyer ℓ selects
a maximum utility basket of goods (x1ℓ, · · · , xnℓ) of cost at most vℓ. Each seller i provides the
demanded goods
∑m
ℓ=1 xiℓ. The resulting excess demand or surplus,
∑m
ℓ=1 xiℓ − wi, is taken from
or added to the warehouse stock. Seller i has a warehouse of capacity ci.
Given initial prices p◦i , warehouse stocks s
◦
i , where 0 < s
◦
i < ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and ideal warehouse
stocks s∗i , 0 < s
∗
i < ci, the task is to repeatedly adjust prices so as to converge to equilibrium prices
with the warehouse stocks converging to their ideal values. We let si denote the current contents
of warehouse i, and sei = si − s∗i denote the excess warehouse reserves.
We suppose that it is the sellers that are adjusting the prices of their goods. In order to have
progress, we require them to change prices at least once a day. However, for the most part, we
impose no upper bound on the frequency of price changes. Indeed, we will see that having more
frequent price changes is helpful in the event that very low prices are present. This entails measuring
demand on a finer scale than day units. We take a very simple approach: we assume that each
buyer spends their money at a uniform rate throughout the day. (Equivalently, this is saying that
buyers with collectively identical profiles occur throughout the day, though really similar profiles
suffice for our analysis.) Likewise, if one supposes there is a limit to the granularity, this imposes
a limit on the frequency of price changes.
Market Properties In an effort to capture the distributed nature of markets and the possibly
limited knowledge of individual price setters, we impose several constraints on procedures we wish
to consider:
3Equilibria exist under quite mild conditions (see [32] §17.C, for example).
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1. Limited information: the price setter for good i knows only the price, supply, and excess
demand of good i, both current and past history. Thus the price updates can depend on this
information only. Notably, this precludes the use not only of other prices or demands, but
also of any information about the specific form of utility functions.
2. Simple actions: The price setters’ procedures should be simple.
3. Asynchrony: Price updates for different goods are allowed to be asynchronous.
4. Fast Convergence: The price update procedure should converge quickly toward equilibrium
prices from any initial price vector.
5. Robustness to Inaccuracy: Even if the demand data is somewhat inaccurate, the procedure
should still converge to approximately the equilibrium prices.
We call procedures that satisfy the first three constraints local, by contrast with centralized proce-
dures that use more complete (global) information about the market.
Next, we discuss the motivations for these constraints.
Constraint (1) stems from the plausible assertion that not everything about the market will be
known to a single price setter. While no doubt some information about several goods is known to
a price setter, it is a conservative assumption to assume less is known, for any convergence result
carries over to the broader setting. Further, it is far from clear how to model the broader setting.
Constraint (2), simplicity, is in the eye of the beholder. Its presence reflects our view that
without further information, this is both generally applicable and plausible.
Constraint (3), asynchrony, is an inherent property of independent price adjustments. Since
the price setter of good i reacts only to trade in good i, the price adjustment of good i occurs
independently of other price adjustments.
Constraint (4) arises in an effort to recognize the dynamic nature of real markets, which are
subject to changing supplies and demands over time. However, surely much of the time, markets
are changing gradually, for otherwise there would be no predictability. A natural approximation is
to imagine fixed conditions and seek to come close to an equilibrium in the time they prevail —
hence the desire for rapid convergence.
Constraint (5) recognizes the reality that in practice data is always is a little dated and inac-
curate, and it seems more realistic if procedures tolerate this.
A final issue is that it is an approximation to allow goods and money to be infinitely divisible.
It is useful to understand to what extent this limits convergent behavior. This entails a variety of
changes to the standard definitions used for continuous (divisible) markets: it turns out it is no
longer sensible to constrain demands (or utilities) at the individual level, but only in the aggregate,
and the notion of weak gross substitutes needs to be modified (relaxed in fact), but not in the way
used in the literature for (discrete) matching markets. We call this modified setting the indivisible
goods market, but we are intending a setting in which there are still many copies of each good,
rather than a setting in which each good is unique or close to unique.
1.2 Previous Work
To the best of our knowledge, asynchronous price update algorithms have not been considered
previously. Further, there has been no complexity analysis of even synchronous tatonnement algo-
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rithms with this type of limited information. While Uzawa [47] gave a synchronous algorithm of
this type, he only showed convergence, and did not address speed of convergence.
The existence of market equilibria has been a central topic of economics since the problem was
formulated by Walras in 1874 [51]. Tatonnement was described more precisely as a differential
equation by Samuelson [42]:
dpi/dt = µizi. (1)
The µi are arbitrary positive constants that represent rates of adjustment for the different prices;
they need not all be the same. Arrow, Block, and Hurwitz, and Nikaido and Uzawa [1, 2, 36] showed
that for markets of gross substitutes the above differential equation will converge to an equilibrium
price.
Unfortunately, for general utility functions (i.e. that do not lead to gross substitutability), the
equilibrium need not be stable and the differential equation (and thus also discretized versions)
need not converge [43]. Partly in response, Smale described a convergent procedure that uses the
derivative matrix of excess demands with respect to prices [46]. Following this, Saari and Simon [41]
showed that any price update algorithm which uses an update that is a fixed function of excesses
and their derivatives with respect to prices needs to use essentially all the derivatives in order to
converge in all markets. However, this is viewed as being an excessive amount of information, in
general.
There are really two questions here. The first is how to find an equilibrium, and the second is
how does the market find an equilibrium. The first question is partially addressed by the work of
Arrow et al. and Smale, and addressed further in papers in operations research (notably Scarf [44]
gives a (non-polynomial) algorithm for computing equilibrium prices), and theoretical computer
science, where there are a series of very nice results demonstrating equilibria as the solutions to
convex programs, or describing combinatorial algorithms to compute such equilibria exactly or
approximately. (An early example of a polynomial algorithm for computing market equilibria for
restricted settings is [16]. An extensive list of references is given in the surveys [10, 48].)
We are interested in the second question. The differential equations provide a start here, but
they ignore the discrete nature of markets: prices typically change in discrete increments, not
continuously. In 1960, Uzawa showed that there is a choice of λ for which an obvious discrete
analog of (1) does converge [47]. However, determining the right λ depends on knowing properties
of the matrix of derivatives of demand with respect to price, or in other words, this requires global
information.
In relatively recent work, three separate groups have proposed three distinct discrete update
algorithms for finding equilibrium prices and showed that their algorithms converge in markets of
gross substitutes [29, 12, 8]. However, all of these algorithms use global information. With the
exception of [8], none of this work gives (good) bounds on the rate of convergence. The algorithm
in Codenotti et al. [8] describes a tatonnement algorithm (albeit not asynchronous); however, it
begins by modifying the market by introducing a fictitious player with some convenient properties
that capture global information about the market and have a profound effect on market behavior.
Even in this transformed setting, the price update step uses a global parameter based on the desired
approximation guarantee, and starts with an initial price point that is restricted to lie within a
bounded region containing the equilibrium point. Translating their algorithm back into the real
market, one can see that it does not meet our definition of simplicity or locality.
There are some auction-style algorithms for finding approximate equilibria which also have a
distributed flavor but depend on buyer utilities being separable over the set of goods [22, 23].
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However, these algorithms are not seeking to explain market behavior and not surprisingly do not
obey natural properties of markets.4
The one work in the Computer Science literature considering the indivisible goods setting is
by Deng et al. [13]; this paper was also the one to start the study of market equilibria in the
CS theory community. They showed that it is APX-Hard to approximate equilibrium prices and
allocations for indivisible exchange markets. They also gave an exhaustive algorithm for computing
an approximate equilibrium in polynomial time for markets with a constant number of distinct
goods.
Markets of indivisible goods have been studied by mathematical economists also. Ausubel, Gul
and Stacchetti [3] introduce an “individual substitutes” property so as to ensure that equilibria
exist. Milgrom and Strulovici [34] also consider this setting, replacing the individual substitutes
constraint with the standard WGS constraint. Both works present exhaustive algorithms to find
the equilibrium prices.
The design and analysis of procedures and convergence to equilibria has been a recent topic
of study for game theoretic problems, using the technique of regret minimization in particular
[40, 30, 17, 6]. Other work has studied convergence in network routing and network design games
[7, 20, 24, 35]. In partial contrast, it is known that finding equilibria via local search (e.g., via best
response dynamics) is PLS-complete in many contexts [28, 18]. Recently, Hart and Mansour [25]
gave communication complexity lower bounds to show that in general games, players with lim-
ited information require an exponential (in the number of players) number of steps to reach an
equilibrium.
The design and analysis of convergent asynchronous distributed protocols has also arisen in
network routing, for example [31], and in high latency parallel computing [5]. These lines of work
are perhaps the most similar to ours.
1.3 Our Contribution
As devising a tatonnement-style price update in unsolvable for general markets, our goal has been
to devise plausible constraints that enable rapid convergence. Our overall task has been to devise
a reasonable model, a price update algorithm, a measure of closeness to equilibrium, and then
to analyze the system to demonstrate fast convergence. This also entails identifying appropriate
parameterized constraints on the market.
Loosely speaking, our measure computes the cost of resource misallocation (compared to the
equilibrium allocation). Roughly, we show that the price update process runs in time
O( 1κ log(initial cost/final cost)), where κ is a parameter of the price update protocol, a parameter
that depends on the properties of the market demand. Further, in the case of indivisible goods, we
give nearly tight bounds on the achievable minimum for the final cost. We also bound the needed
warehouse size in terms of the initial (imbalanced) state of the market.
A precursor of this work [11] introduced the Ongoing Market and analyzed it in the context of
divisible markets. The analysis given here is quite distinct and conceptually simpler; it also yields
improved bounds in terms of the parameter constraints. (It is a little difficult to compare the two
works, as the earlier work required more constraints and parameters, and used slightly different
rules for the price updates — the rules in the present paper strike us as more realistic.)
4These algorithms start their computation at a non-arbitrary set of artificially low prices; global information is
used for price initialization; and they work with a global approximation measure — each price update uses the goal
approximation guarantee in its update.
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An initial analysis of markets of indivisible goods appeared in Rastogi’s thesis [39].
The main technical tool for the analysis is the use of a potential function, whose value corre-
sponds to the market resource misallocation. We show the potential decreases continuously at or
above a suitable minimum rate, and never increases.
This work identifies three parameters which govern the rate of convergence and the needed
warehouse sizes. The first parameter, which we call the market demand elasticity, or the market
elasticity for short, governs the rate of convergence of the one-time markets: it is a lower bound on
the fractional rate of change of the demand for any good with respect to its own price: mini
dxi
dpi
/xipi .
The second parameter is the standard elasticity of wealth5 it will be used in the analysis of
convergence rates when rapid price rises are used to mitigate the effects of large demands.
The third parameter is somewhat less intuitive; it governs the needed warehouse sizes. We call
it the equilibrium flex, and it is defined as follows. Let p
(c)
i denote the equilibrium prices for supplies
cwi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we define the equilibrium flex, e(c), by
e(c) = lnmax
i
{
p∗i
p
(c)
i
,
p
(1/c)
i
p∗i
}
where p∗i = p
(1)
i are the equilibrium prices for the market at hand. We remark that the carry-forward
of demand imbalances in Ongoing Markets will create temporary changes in effective supply levels
and hence in the desired equilibrium prices. It is plausible that the size of these changes affects the
convergence rate and not surprising that it affects the needed warehouse size also.
Bounds on e(c) follow from bounds on the elasticity of wealth, but it is not clear that this is a
tight connection.
For a market of buyers all having CES utilities, the values of all these parameters are modest,
as we will see.
2 Results
2.1 The 1-Good Case in a One-Time Market
We begin by considering a tatonnement process in the context of a one-time Fisher market with
a single good, in order to determine reasonable constraints on the demand function, namely con-
straints that enable a fairly rapid convergence of the price toward its equilibrium value.
Let x denote the demand for the good and p its price. We assume that x(p) is a strictly
decreasing function. Let w denote the supply of the good. Our goal is to update p repeatedly so
as to cause x to converge toward w. We will use the following update rule:
p′ = p
(
1 + λmin
{
1,
x− w
w
})
where 0 < λ ≤ 12 is a suitable fixed parameter.
5This is the the fractional rate of change of demand with respect to changes in wealth; it is usually defined for
individual agents; we will use an aggregate definition, obtained when all buyers have the same fractional change in
wealth, or equivalently all prices change by the same fraction.
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We are going to argue that this update function is appropriate for demands x satisfying:
x(p)
p
≤ −dx
dp
≤ Ex(p)
p
, where 1 ≤ E ≤ 1
2λ
. (2)
We will also explain why the update function can be viewed as an approximation of Newton’s
method, but an approximation quite unlike the standard secant method.
Definition 1. Let x′ denote x(p′). Price p′ is said to be on the same side as p if either both
x, x′ ≥ w or both x, x′ ≤ w. We also say that p′ is a same-side update.
Let p∗ denote the value of p for which x(p∗) = w. Note that p′ is on the same side as p exactly
if both p, p′ ≥ p∗ or if both p, p′ ≤ p∗.
While same side updates are not important in the 1d setting, in the multi-dimensional setting
they are needed to ensure progress. And so in the next lemma we investigate how large a step size
is possible while having a same side update.
Lemma 1. Suppose that −pdxdp ≤ Ex(p), for some E ≥ 1. Then the update p′ = p(1+ 12E min{1, x−ww })
is on the same side as p, but the update p′ = p(1 + 1E
x−w
w ) need not be.
Next we investigate the rate of convergence. It might seem natural to determine how quickly
|x∗−x(p)| decreases, but in higher dimensions, this proves a less effective measure. Instead, we will
measure the “distance” from equilibrium by the measure, or potential function, φ(x, p) = |x−w|p.
This can be thought of as the cost in money of the current amount of disequilibrium.
Theorem 1. If x ≤ 2w initially, then in one iteration φ reduces by at least w|p′ − p| = λφ, where
p is the price before the update and p′ the price after the update. Hence in O( 1λ log
φI
φF
) iterations,
φ reduces from φI to at most φF . If x ≥ 2w initially, then in one interation φ reduces by at least
w|p′ − p| = λ wx−wφ. Hence in O( 1λ x−ww log φIφF ) iterations, φ reduces from φI to at most φF .
2.2 The Multidimensional Case, Synchronous Updates, One-Time Market
We start by investigating the multidimensional case in the event that all prices are updated si-
multaneously as the analysis is relatively simple. We will see that the rate of convergence is very
similar to that which was obtained in the 1d case.
Recall that there are n goods g1, g2, · · · , gn. Let p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) be the n-vector of prices
for these goods, and let xi(p), or xi for short, denote the demand for the ith good at prices p (that
is, it is a function of all the prices, not just the price of the ith good).
Again, we use the update rule
p′i = pi
(
1 + λmin
{
1,
xi − wi
wi
})
.
Again, we assume that the demands satisfy the bounded rate of change property which we term
bounded elasticity in the current context.
Definition 2. Good i has bounded elasticity E, if for any collection p of prices:
xi(p)
pi
≤ −dxi
dpi
≤ Exi(p)
pi
, where 1 ≤ E ≤ 1
2λ
.
The market has (demand) elasticity E if every good has bounded elasticity E.
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We are thinking of E’s value as a constant. To motivate this, we give the value of E for some
standard utility functions: if all buyers have Cobb-Douglas utilities [32] (p. 612), then E = 1; if all
buyers have CES utilities [32] (p. 97) with parameter ρ, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, then E = 1/(1 − ρ).
We will also need the standard assumption of Weak Gross Substitutes (WGS) to somewhat
constrain how one price change affects demands for other goods.
Definition 3. A market satisfies the gross substitutes property (GS ) if for any good i, increasing
pi leads to increased demand for all other goods. The market satisfies weak gross substitutes if the
demand for every other good increases or stays the same.
We use the potential function φ =
∑
i φi, where φi = pi|xi − wi|. So the effect of an update to
pi on φi is just as in the 1-d case. However the update may also affect the demands xj , and hence
the potentials φj , for goods j 6= i.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the market obeys WGS and has elasticity E. When all the prices are
updated simultaneously, if λ(2E− 1) ≤ 12 , φ =
∑
i φi reduces by at least
∑
i λφ
I
i min
{
1, wi|xi−wi|
}
. If
the demands satisfy xi ≤ dwi throughout, then φ reduces from φI to at most φF in O( 1λ(d−1) log φIφF )
iterations.
Bounding d is non-trivial, for an update to xj, j 6= i, may cause xi to increase. We return to
this issue later.
2.3 The Multidimensional Case, Asynchronous Updates, One-Time Market
But we don’t want to assume that all the price updates are simultaneous. For this to make sense
we have to reinterpret the meaning of the parameters for supply and demand. We now view these
as rates.
To make this concrete, let us call the basic time unit a day. wi is the daily supply of good i,
which is assumed to arrive continuously throughout the day. xi will be the instantaneous rate of
demand given the current prices. The demand over some time period [t1, t2] is given by
∫ t2
t1
xi(t)dt.
We are interested in scaling this demand by the time period; we call this the average demand,
denoted xi[t1, t2]; i.e., xi[t1, t2] =
1
t2−t1
∫ t2
t1
xi(t)dt. We are particularly interested in the average
demand for good i since the time of last update to pi, at time τi say: we define the average demand
at the current time by xi = xi[τi, t] =
1
t2−t1
∫ t2
t1
xi(t)dt. As we will see later when we introduce
warehouses, the average demand can be measured in our setting and so this is the value for the
demand that will be used in the price update function:
p′i = pi
(
1 + λmin
{
1,
xi − wi
wi
})
.
To ensure progress we require that each price updates at least once a day.
We use the following potential function: φ =
∑
i φi, where
φi(xi, xi, wi) = pi [span(xi, xi, wi)− α1λ|wi − xi|(t− τi)] , (3)
with α1 > 0 being a suitable constant and span(x, y, z) denoting the length of the interval spanned
by its arguments, i.e. max{x, y, z} −min{x, y, z}.
We now show a bound on the convergence rate which is broadly the same as the one that applies
when the updates are synchronous.
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Theorem 3. Suppose that the market obeys WGS and has elasticity E. If xi ≤ dwi, for all i,
where d ≥ 2, α1(d− 1) ≤ 1, λα1 + λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE
)
≤ 1, and each price is updated at least once every
day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− λα12 factor daily. Hence φ reduces from φI to at most φF in
O( 1λα1 (d− 1) log
φI
φF
) days.
In the current setting, the natural measure of misspending on good i is |xi−wi|pi, for as we will
see when we consider warehouses, the difference |xi −wi| is what we can measure, and this is used
as the indicator of how far from equilibrium pi currently is, and hence how to update it. However,
we also have to take account of the current rate of excess demand, |xi − wi|. Thus we define the
misspending S to be
S =
∑
i
[|xi(t′)− wi|+ |xi − wi|]pi.
Clearly, φ = θ(S).
We can conclude that, while it is not necessarily decreasing at all times, over time the mis-
spending decreases at the same rate as φ.
2.4 The Ongoing Market, or Incorporating Warehouses
For the market model to be self-contained, we need to explain how excess demand is met and what
is done with excess supply. The solution is simple: we provide finite capacity warehouses (buffers
in computer science terminology) that can store excess supply and meet excess demand. There
is one warehouse per good. The price-setter for a good changes prices as needed to ensure the
corresponding warehouse neither overfills nor runs out of goods.
Just as the demand is a rate, we imagine the supply to be a rate, which for the purposes of
analysis we treat as being a fixed rate. Each ∆t long instant, the resulting excess demand or
surplus, (xi − wi)∆t, is taken from or added to the warehouse stock.
Let ci be the capacity of the warehouse for good i. Each warehouse is assumed to have a target
ideal content of s∗i units (perhaps the most natural value is s
∗
i = ci/2).
The goal is to repeatedly adjust prices so as to converge to near-equilibrium prices with the
warehouse stocks converging to near-ideal values. A further issue is to determine what size ware-
house suffices, which we defer to a later section.
The price update rule needs to take account of the current state of the warehouse, namely
whether it is relatively full or empty. To this end, let τi be the time of the previous update to pi.
let t be the current time, and let si denote the current contents of warehouse i. Then the target
excess demand, zi, is given by xi[τi, t]−wi+κi(si−s∗i ) where κi > 0 is a suitable (small) parameter.
So zi =
si(τi)−si(t)
t−τi
+ κi(si − s∗i ) and is readily calculated by monitoring warehouse stocks. We let
w˜i denote wi − κi(si − s∗i ), which we call the target demand.
We will need the following constraint on κi.
Constraint 1. κi(si − s∗i ) = |w˜i − wi| ≤ 13wi.
For simplicity, henceforth we assume that κ = κi for all i.
The price of good i is updated according to the following rule:
p′i ← pi
(
1 + λ median
{
−1, zi(p)
wi
, 1
})
(4)
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This rule ensures that the change to pi is bounded by ±λpi.
We redefine the potential φi to also take account of the imbalance in the warehouse stock as
follows:
φi = pi[span(xi, xi, w˜i)− λα1(t− τi)|xi − w˜i|+ α2|w˜i − wi|]
where 1 < α2 < 2 is a suitable constant; this is simply Equation 3, with w˜i replacing wi and with
the additional term α2pi|w˜i −wi|.
We redefine the misspending S to take account of the warehouse imbalance:
S =
∑
i
[|xi(t′)− wi|+ |xi − wi|]pi.+ |w˜i(t′)− wi|]pi.
Again, φ = θ(S).
Theorem 4. If Constraint 1 holds and xi ≤ dw˜i, α2 = 32 , α1 = 116 , λE ≤ 117 , λEd ≤ 517 , λ ≤ 114 ,
κ ≤ λα110 , and each price is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)4
factor daily.
In fact, if φ ≥ 2(1 + 2α2)
∑
i |w˜i −wi|pi, then φ decreases by at least a 1− λα18(1+α2) factor daily.
Once the potential is largely due to the warehouse imbalances, the daily rate of decrease of φ
drops from 1− θ(λα1) to 1− θ(κ), which seems unavoidable as the improvement to the warehouse
contents may be only wi, which contributes an α2κwipi reduction to φi, but φi could be of size
θ(wipi).
We do not mean to suggest that the above values for the parameters are tight or even nearly
tight. Rather the result should be understood as indicating the order of magnitude rate of conver-
gence.
2.5 Bounds on Prices and Demands
Here, we determine an bounds on prices and demands that hold throughout, given initial bounds
on demands, and hence what value of d can be used in Theoremlem:war-progr-bdd-dem.
Definition 4. Prices are f -bounded if pi always remains in the range p
∗
i e
±f for all i, where p∗i is
the equilibrium value for pi, and demands are d-bounded if xi ≤ dwi for all i.
Definition 5. p(c) denotes the equilibrium prices for supplies cwi.
Definition 6. Prices p are c-demand bounded if pi ∈ [p(c)i , p(1/c)i ] for all i. The equilibrium flex,
e(c), is defined to be
e(c) = lnmax
i
{
p∗i
p
(c)
i
,
p
(1/c)
i
p∗i
}
where p∗i = p
(1)
i are the equilibrium prices for the market at hand. Note that c-demand bounded
prices are e(c)-bounded.
For CES utilities (with parameter ρ) e(c) = ln c (it is independent of ρ).
Lemma 2. If λE1−λE ≤ 16 , and if initially the prices have all been c-demand bounded for a full day
for some c ≥ 2, they remain c-demand bounded thereafter.
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Definition 7. Suppose that the prices are always c-demand bounded. Let f = f(c) be the corre-
sponding f -bound on the prices and given the prices are f -bounded, let d(f) be the demand bound
(conceivably, d≫ c).
Lemma 3. d(f) ≤ e2Ef .
It follows that given a c-demand bound for the first day of the update process, there is a value
for f = f(c), implied by the uniqueness of equilibria in this setting, which in turn yields a bound
on d(f).
Next, we obtain a bound on e(c) given the assumption of 0-homegeneity6 and a lower bound of
0 on the elasticity of wealth.
Definition 8. Suppose that the money of each buyer increases by a multiplier γ. We define ξwi ,
the elasticity of good i with respect to wealth, to be ξwi =
dxi
dγ /xi. We say that the market has a
bounded wealth elasticity Ew ≥ 0 if ξwi ≥ −Ew for all i. 7 When Ew = 0, the market is said to
have normal demands (see [32] page 25 ).
For CES utilities, Ew = −1 (this is a stronger bound than is used in any of our analyses.)
Notation. Let ρ = maxi,j
wip∗i
wjp∗j
.
Lemma 4. If the demands are all normal, then e(c) ≤ ln[c(ρn)(c−1)].
We can still obtain bounds on e(c) for positive Ew, but they are much larger.
We note that even the bound of Lemma 4 is large and implies that a small change in supplies
could have a huge effect on the values of some of the equilibrium prices. This seems implausible
as a practical matter, and as the bound of Lemma 3 and hence the convergence rate depend on
the value of e(c) it suggests that our bounds based on the elasticity of wealth, rather than the
equilibrium flex, may be unduly pessimistic.
Prior work [11] made the stronger assumption that Ew < 0 (though this was expressed in a
different way).
2.6 Faster Updates with Large Demands, Ongoing Market
As we have seen, when demands are large initially, the rate of convergence depends inversely on a
bound on a parameter d where for each i, dwi bounds the demand for good i. As we will see the
bound on the warehouse sizes also depends on d.
We now show how to avoid this dependence, by a plausible and modest change to the frequency
of the price updates.
It seems reasonable that when demands are large, the seller will observe this quickly (due to
stock being drawn from its warehouse) and consequently will quickly adjust its price. Accordingly,
we introduce a new rule for the frequency of updates: in addition to the once a day update,
whenever wi units of good i have been sold since the last update, price pi is updated.
In addition, we will need the E′ bound on the elasticity of wealth.
6i.e. if the money of each agent and prices all increase by a multiplicative factor γ > 0 this leaves demands
unchanged.
7It is usual to define the elasticity of wealth for each individual separately. It is not hard to see that if each
individual has wealth elasticity Ew then this implies the Ew bound in our definition.
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We significantly modify our basic potential function for this analysis, as will be seen when the
analysis is carried out. Here the relationship between S and φ is a bit looser: S = O(φ) = O(S+M),
where M is the daily supply of money.
Theorem 5. If Constraint 1 holds, d = 5, α2 =
3
2 , λ(E+E
′) ≤ 117 , α1 ≤ 116 , λα1+43λ
(
7
4 +
10E
1−λE
)
≤
1, κ ≤ λα113 , and each price is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− 14κ
factor daily.
Again, we could prove a 1− θ(λα1) decrease when φ = Ω(
∑
i wipi).
2.7 Bounds on Warehouse Sizes
For simplicity, we will assume that ci/wi is the same for all i. Also, for simplicity, we suppose that
s∗i =
1
2ci, that is the target fullness for each warehouse is half full.
We view each warehouse as having 8 equal sized zones of fullness, with the goal being to bring
the warehouse into its central four zones. The role of the outer zones is to provide the buffer to
cope with initial price imbalances.
Definition 9. The four zones above the half way target are called the high zones, and the other
four are the low zones. Going from he center outward, the zones are called the safe zone, the inner
buffer, the middle buffer, and the outer buffer.
Theorem 6. Suppose that the prices are always f -bounded and let d = d(f). Also suppose that
each price is updated at least once a day. Suppose further that the warehouses are initially all in
their safe or inner buffer zones. Finally, suppose that λ
(
1 + 1α4
)
≤ 12 , where α4= κci8wi . Then the
warehouse stocks never go outside their outer buffers (i.e. they never overflow or run out of stock)
if α4κ =
ci
8wi
≥ max
{
(d− 1)D, 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8λα4
}
; furthermore, after D + 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8λα4 +
8
κ
days the warehouses will be in their safe or inner buffer zones thereafter, where
D =
16(1 + α2)
λα1
log
φinit
1−λα1
2 miniwip
∗
i
,
and φinit is the initial value of φ.
If the fast updates rule is followed, then it suffices to have α4κ =
ci
8wi
≥ 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8λα4 , and
then after
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8λα4λ +
8
κ days the warehouses will be in their safe or inner buffer zones
thereafter.
2.8 The Effect of Inaccuracy
Next, we investigate the robustness of the tatonnement process with respect to inaccuracy in the
demand data. To mitigate the intricacy of the analysis, we return to the setting without fast
updates.
Specifically, we assume that there may be an error of up to ρwi in the reported values of si(t)
and si(τi), where ρ > 0 is a constant parameter. Recall that these are the values which are used
to calculate zi (=
si(τi)−si(t)
t−τi
+ κi(si(t) − s∗i )). Let zci denote the correct value for zi, and zri the
reported value.
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To enable us to control the effect of erroneous updates, we will place a lower bound on the
frequency of updates to a given price. Specifically, successive updates are at most 1 day apart (as
before), and at least 1/b days apart, where b ≥ 1 is a parameter.
We consider two scenarios:
(i) The parameter ρ is not known to the price-setters, who then perform updates as before.
We show that for φ ≥ ρb2 λκEM , φ reduces by a (1−Θ(κ)) factor daily.
(ii) The parameter ρ is known to the price-setter for each good i, who performs an update only if
the possible error is at most half of the reported value zri , i.e. if |zri − zci | ≤ 12zri .
Then, we show that for φ ≥ ρbM , φ reduces by a (1−Θ(κ)) factor daily.
It may seem more appealing to allow multiplicative errors of up to 1 ± ρ in the reported si.
However, this seems a little unreasonable in the case that the actual si(t)−si(τ) is relatively small.
Also, later we will consider a scenario in which more frequent updates are required when si(t)
changes rapidly, and then a multiplicative rule for the error in the change to the warehouse stock
would give an error no larger than the additive rule.
Contrariwise, one might argue that if the warehouse stock is changing only slightly, then the
perceived error ought to be small. But once one considers that there is a daily supply of wi units
of the ith good, and that possibly the error reflects fluctuations in the selling of these wi units, an
error of ±ρwi seems reasonable.
Our analysis for Case (i) uses the potential function φ =
∑
i φi, from Section 2.4.
Theorem 7. If xi ≤ dw˜i for and i and Constraint 1 hold, α22 + α1max{32 , (d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, κ(α2−1)2 ≤ 1, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 , and each price is updated at least
once every day, and at most every 1/b days, and if φ ≥ 16µMκ(α2−1)
1−λα1
1−λα1−µ
at the start of the day,
then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)8 factor by the end of the day, where M is the daily supply
of money and µ = 43λρb(2b+ κ)
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
, supposing that κ(α2 − 1) ≥ 16µ/[1− λα1 − µ].
Case (ii) yields a less stringent constraint on ρ. We use a slightly different potential for which
again φ(t) ≤ S(t) = O(φ(t− 1).
Theorem 8. If xi ≤ dw˜i for and i and Constraint 1 hold, α22 + α1max{3, 2(d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
2λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, 4κ(1+α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 for all i, κ(α2−1)2 ≤ 1, µ
[
1+µ/(1−λα1)
1−µ/(1−λα1)
+ 1(1−λα1)
]
≤
κ(α2−1)
2 , if φ ≥ 32µM[1− µ
1−λα1
][(κ(α2−1)]
at the start of the day, where µ = 8κ(1+α2)(2b+κ)ρ, and if each
price is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)8 factor daily.
Remark. For both update rules in this section, to obtain bounds on the needed warehouse sizes,
we need to use the fast update variant; this is left to the interested reader.
2.9 Discrete Goods and Prices
Now we investigate the effect of only allowing integer-valued prices and finitely divisible goods: this
is implemented by requiring each wi to be an integer and goods to be sold in integral quantities.
Demands as a Rate. With limited divisibility, we need to look again at our interpretation of
demands as a rate.
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xi(p), the daily demand for good i at prices p, is simply the demand were all the prices to
remain unchanged over the course of a day. The ideal demand for good i over time interval [t1, t2]
with unchanged prices is defined to be xi(p)(t2 − t1). Ideal demand xI2(t1, t2) for good i over time
interval [t1, t2] with possibly varying prices is given by
∫ t2
t1
xi(p)dt. Note that this is in fact a sum
as there are only finitely many price changes.
The actual demand xAi (t1, t2) over the time interval [t1, t2] is the supply minus the growth in
the warehouse stock: wi(t2 − t1)− [si(t2)− si(t1)].
In order to achieve approximately uniform demand as a function of prices, we require that
|xAi (t1, t2) − xIi (t1, t2)| < 1, for all times t1, t2 at which price pi is considered for an update (i.e.
both actual and null updates).
We will also define ideal warehouse contents. The ideal content of warehouse i, sIi is simply the
contents of the warehouse had xIi been the demand throughout. Note that |sAi −sIi | = |xAi −xIi | < 1.
w˜Ii is defined in terms of s
I
i : w˜
I
i = wi − κ(sIi − s∗i ); w˜Ai can be defined analogously. Note that
|w˜Ii − w˜Ai | < κ. We also define xAi = xi − w˜Ai and xIi = xi − w˜Ii . The computation of price updates
uses xAi .
Discrete WGS. We need to redefine WGS and the bounds on the rate of change in demand w.r.t.
prices so that we can carry out an analysis similar to that for the divisible case.
In the Fisher market context it is not hard to see that WGS imposes the same constraints
on the spending and the demand for each good. This means that in the discrete setting under
WGS, if the price pi increases by one unit, then as the spending does not increase, the demand for
good i must drop, so if the demand at price pi is xi, at price pi + xi it must be zero. This seems
unnatural. This impression is reinforced by considering what happens were half units of money to
be introduced, with WGS remaining in place. Then at price pi + xi/2 the demand would have to
be 0. This suggests that the property ought to be modified in the discrete setting.
Accordingly, we define a market to satisfy the Discrete WGS property if, for any good i, reducing
its price pi to pi − ∆ only reduces demand for all other non-money goods, and the spending on
good i is now at least pixi(pi)− [(pi−∆)− 1], i.e. the spending, if reduced, is reduced by less than
the cost of one item. Note that it need not be that all the money is spent (for there may be left
over money which is insufficient to buy one item of any good).
Elasticity of Demand and the Parameter E. We define the following bounded analog for
discrete markets. Suppose that the prices of all goods other than good i is set to p−i. Then, for all
li ≤ pi ≤ qi, ⌊
xi(li, p−i)
(
li
pi
)E⌋
≤ xi(p) ≤
⌈
xi(qi, p−i)
(
qi
pi
)E⌉
.
The crucial observation is that there is a fully divisible market with elasticity bound 2E that
has demands yi very similar to those for the discrete market: for every price vector p which induces
non-zero demand for every good, for all i, xi(p) − 1 < yi(p) ≤ xi(p). Given this correspondence,
the analysis of the discrete case becomes similar to that for inaccurate data.
Indivisibility Parameters. We measure the indivisibility of the market in terms of two parame-
ters, r and s. r = M/
∑
iwi, where M is the daily supply of money; it provides an upper bound on
the weighted average price for an item at equilibrium. This can be thought of as the granularity of
money at the equilibrium. s = mini wi is the minimum size for the daily supply for any item, and
thus indicates the granularity of the least divisible good.
Next, we restate Constraint 1 and Lemma 1, replacing w˜i with w˜
I
i .
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Constraint 2. |w˜Ii − wi| ≤ 13wi.
Again, if φ is large enough that the following theorem guarantees it decreases, then φ = O(S).
Theorem 9. If Constraint 2 holds and yi ≤ dw˜i for all i, α22 + α1max{92 , 2(d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
8
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, each wi ≥ 6, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 for all i,
s ≥ 48(α2−1)(1−λα1)
[
1 + 6(1 + α2) + (1 + α2)
1−λα1+
18
s
κ(1+α2)+
3κ
s
1−λα1−
18
s
κ(1+α2)
]
,
if φ(τ) ≥ 48(α2−1)
[
(1 + α2)
(
4
λr +
24
s
)
+ 1s
]
1−λα1
1−λα1−
18
s
κ(1+α2)
M at the start of the day, and if each price
is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)8 factor over the course
of the day.
Remark. Again, to obtain bounds on the needed warehouse sizes, we need to use the fast update
rule.
Theorem 10. In the discrete setting there are markets with Ω(E/r) misspending at any pricing.
2.10 Extensions
We briefly examine how the analysis can be applied to some divisible markets in which the WGS
constraint is relaxed, and also indicate a possible extension to a class of markets that interpolate
between the pure Fisher market and an Exchange market.
3 The Analysis
We now prove the above results. For readability, we repeat the statements of lemmas and theorems.
From a technical perspective, the novely in this analysis lies in the approach for coping with
asynchrony. The idea is to have a potential which decreases either at or faster than the desired
rate of improvement, and whenever an event occurs (a price update), ensure that the potential
either stays the same or decreases further. Of course, the “real” decreases are due to the updates,
but because of the interplay between the different prices and demands, it proves easier to show the
desired rate of progress using our approach.
The most challenging of these analyses is the one used to handle the fast updates. Because
the fast updates may introduce some temporarily “bad” events (events that would increase the
potential) these are deferred for the purposes of the analysis. Tracking the differences between the
real market and the market with deferred events is a delicate matter which has to be done with
considerable accuracy. The resulting potential function is fairly elaborate.
We now proceed to prove the results in the order they were introduced in the previous section.
3.1 A Single Good
Let x denote the demand for the good and p its price. We assume that x(p) is a strictly decreasing
function. Let w denote the supply of the good. Our goal is to update p repeatedly so as to cause
x to converge toward w. We will use the following update rule:
p′ = p
(
1 + λmin
{
1,
x− w
w
})
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where 0 < λ ≤ 12 is a suitable fixed parameter.
We are going to argue that this update function is appropriate for demands x satisfying:
x(p)
p
≤ −dx
dp
≤ Ex(p)
p
, where 1 ≤ E ≤ 1
2λ
. (5)
We will also explain why the update function can be viewed as an approximation of Newton’s
method, but an approximation quite unlike the standard secant method.
The following fact will be used repeatedly in our analysis.
Fact 1. (a) If δ ≥ −1 and either a ≤ 0, or a ≥ 1, then (1 + δ)a ≥ 1 + aδ.
(b) If 0 > δ ≥ −12 and 0 < a < 1, then (1 + δ)a ≥ 1 + 2aδ.
(c) If δ ≥ −1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, then (1 + δ)a ≤ 1 + aδ, and the inequality is strict if a 6= 0, 1.
(d) If −1 < ρ ≤ δ ≤ 0 and −1 ≤ a ≤ 0, or if a ≤ −1 and 0 ≤ aδ ≤ ρ < 1, then (1 + δ)a ≤
1 + aδ/(1 − ρ).
(e) If 0 ≤ δ ≤ ρ < 1 and −1 ≤ a ≤ 0, then (1 + δ)a ≤ 1 + aδ(1 − ρ).
Proof. We prove (a)–(c), using a simplified version of Taylor’s Theorem:
Theorem 11 (Taylor). If f is a twice differentiable function in the interval [0, x] (or [x, 0], if
x < 0) then there is a ξ ∈ [0, x] (or ξ ∈ [x, 0], if x < 0) such that
f(x) = f(0) + f ′(0) ∗ x+ f
′′(ξ)
2
x2.

Let f(x) = (1 + x)a. Then f ′(x) = a(1 + x)a−1, f ′′(x) = a(a − 1)(1 + x)a−2, f(0) = 1, and
f ′(0) = a. Thus we have that
(1 + x)a = 1 + ax+
a(a− 1)
2
(1 + ξ)a−2x2.
If the last term is nonnegative, then we have that (1 + x)a ≥ 1 + ax. The last term is nonnegative
provided that x ≥ −1 (implying ξ ≥ −1) and either a ≥ 1 or a ≤ 0. This is (a).
If the last term is nonpositive, then we have that (1+x)a ≤ 1+ax. The last term is nonpositive
provided that x ≥ −1 and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, and strictly negative if 0 < a < 1. This is (c).
(b) holds if the last term is at least ax. This is true since ax < 0 and 0 < (a−1)2 (1 + ξ)
a−2x < 1
when 0 ≥ ξ ≥ x ≥ −12 and 0 < a < 1.
Parts (d) and (e) are obtained by bounding the limit of the infinite Taylor series for (1 + δ)a.
Namely,
(1 + δ)a =
∑
i≥0
δi
a(a− 1)(a− 2) · · · (a− i+ 1)
i!
.
If −1 ≤ a ≤ 0 and δ ≤ 0, then, for i ≥ 0, (a− i)/(i+1) ≥ −1, and so δ(a− i)/(i+1) ≤ −δ; in this
case the sum is bounded by 1 +
∑
i≥1 aδ(−δ)i−1 ≤ 1 + aδ/(1− ρ), as claimed for the first result in
(d).
If a ≤ −1 and 0 ≤ aδ < 1, then (a − i)/(i + 1) ≥ a, and so δ(a − i)/(i + 1) ≤ aδ; in this case the
sum is bounded by 1 +
∑
i≥1(aδ)
i ≤ 1 + aδ/(1 − ρ), as claimed for the second result in (d).
If −1 ≤ a ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ δ < 1, then, for i ≥ 0, 0 ≥ (a − i)/(i + 1) ≥ −1; in this case the sum is
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a sequence of alternating terms, each successive term being smaller in magnitude by at least a δ
factor. Consequently, the sum is bounded by 1 + aδ − aδ2 ≤ 1 + aδ(1 − ρ) (recall that a ≤ 0), as
claimed for the result in (e).
Lemma 5. For ∆ > 0, x(p)
(1+∆)E
≤ x(p(1 + ∆)) ≤ x(p)(1+∆) and x(p)(1−∆) ≤ x(p(1−∆)) ≤ x(p)(1−∆)E .
Proof. If dxdp = −Ex/p for all p, then d(p
Ex)
dp = 0 for all p, and then p
E ·x(p) = pE(1+∆)E ·x(p(1+∆)),
for all ∆ (positive or negative). Similarly, if dxdp = −x/p for all p, then d(px)dp = 0 for all p, and then
p · x(p) = p(1 +∆) · x(p(1+∆)). These cases provide the extreme bounds on the growth of x from
which the claimed bounds follow.
Corollary 1. f(p) = p · x(p) is a non-increasing function of p.
Proof. p(1 + ∆) · x(p(1 + ∆)) ≤ p(1 + ∆) · x(p)/(1 + ∆) = p · x(p).
Lemma 1. Suppose that −pdxdp ≤ Ex(p), for some E ≥ 1. Then the update p′ = p(1+ 12E min{1, x−ww })
is on the same side as p, but the update p′ = p(1 + 1E
x−w
w ) need not be.
Proof. If p′ = p(1 + ∆) is not on the same side as p for ∆ > 0, then x(p) > w > x(p(1 + ∆)). By
Lemma 5, this implies that w > x(p)(1 + ∆)−E; equivalently, x(p) < w(1 + ∆)E ≤ w(1 + 2E∆) if
E∆ ≤ 12 (applying Fact 1(d) with ρ = 12); thus either E∆ ≥ 12 or w(1 + 2E∆) > x(p). It follows
that ∆ ≥ 12E min{x−ww , 1}.
Next, we show that replacing the 1/(2E) parameter by 1/E can result in updates which are
not on the same side. Consider the case that dxdp = −E xp for all p; then, as noted in the proof of
Lemma 5, pE · x(p) is constant. Let p(w) denote the price at which the demand is w. In this case
p(w) = p · ( xw )1/E = p · (1+ x−ww )1/E < p · (1+ 1E x−ww ) if 1/E < 1 (applying Fact 1(c)). Now suppose
that the update rule being used is p′ = p(1+ 1E
x−w
w ). Then p
′ > p(w) and this would not be a same
side update.
Finally, suppose that p′ = p(1 −∆) is not on the same side as p for ∆ > 0; then x(p) < w <
x(p(1+∆)). By Lemma 5, this implies that w < x(p)(1+∆)−E ; equivalently, x(p) > w(1−∆)E ≥
w(1 −E∆) as |∆| ≤ 1 (applying Fact 1(a)); it follows that ∆ > − 1E x−ww .
Thus, if we want same-side updates, and we are using the rule p′ = p(1+λx−ww ) when
x−w
w ≤ 1
(i.e. x ≤ 2w) then we are obliged to have a derivative bound more or less of the form given in
Equation 2.
For x > 2w, the update p′ = p(1 + λ) is not the largest possible same-side update, but it is
simple which is why we use it.
Another way to view the update rule is to see it as an approximate form of Newton’s method:
p′ = p− x(p)− w
dx/dp
.
Instead of dx/dp (which is not available in our setting) we use a lower bound on its value (recall
that dx/dp is negative by assumption), for this only reduces the change to p. The lower bound is
−Ex(p)/p. This yields
p′ = p+
p
E
x(p)− w
x(p)
.
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When x(p) < w, replacing x(p) by w in the denominator only decreases the lower bound on dx/dp
further, and yields the update rule p′ = p+ pE
x(p)−w
w . Note that our update rule achieves half this
step size when λ = 1/(2E).
When x(p) > w we have two cases:
x(p) ≤ 2w: then replacing x(p) by 2w in the denominator only decreases the lower bound on dx/dp,
while our update rule achieves this step size when λ = 1/(2E).
x(p) ≥ 2w: then replacing x(p) by 2(x(p)−w) only decreases the lower bound, and once again our
update rule achieves this step size when λ = 1/(2E).
Next we investigate the rate of convergence. Recall that we measure the “distance” from
equilibrium by the potential function φ(x, p) = |x− w|p.
Lemma 6. φ increases as p diverges from p∗ (in either direction).
Proof. By Corollary 1, p · x(p) is a non-increasing function of p. For p > p∗, φ = pw − px(p); pw
is strictly increasing, and −px(p) is non-decreasing; thus in this case φ is strictly increasing. For
p < p∗, φ = px(p)−pw; as a function of −p, px(p) is non-decreasing, and −pw is strictly increasing;
thus φ is a strictly increasing function of −p in this case. Together, these observations show that
φ is strictly increasing as p diverges from p∗.
Notation. φI denotes the initial value of φ and φF a target final upper bound for φ.
Theorem 1. If x ≤ 2w initially, then in one interation φ reduces by at least w|p′− p| = λφ, where
p is the price before the update and p′ the price after the update. Hence in O( 1λ log
φI
φF
) iterations,
φ reduces from φI to at most φF . If x ≥ 2w initially, then in one interation φ reduces by at least
w|p′ − p| = λ wx−wφ. Hence in O( 1λ x−ww log φIφF ) iterations, φ reduces from φI to at most φF .
Proof. Case 1: x < w.
Let p′ = p(1−∆), where ∆ = −λmin{1, x−ww } = −λx−ww > 0.
Then, as the price update is same-sided, the value of the potential after the price is updated is
given by φ′ = p(1−∆)[w − x(p(1−∆))]. This is bounded as follows:
p(1−∆)[w − x(p(1−∆))] ≤ p(1−∆)w − p · x(p)
as p · x(p) ≤ p(1−∆) · x(p(1−∆)) by Corollary 1
≤ p(w − x)−∆wp.
Thus φ− φ′ ≥ ∆wp = w · λpw−xw = λφ. Also note that ∆wp = (p− p′)w = w|p − p′|.
Case 2 : x > w.
Now, let p′ = p(1 + ∆), where ∆ = λmin{1, x−ww } > 0.
Again, as the price update is same-sided, the value of the potential after the price is updated
is given by φ′ = p(1 + ∆)[x(p(1 + ∆))− w]. This is bounded as follows:
p(1 + ∆)[x(p(1 + ∆))− w] ≤ p · x(p)− p(1 + ∆)w
as p · x(p) ≥ p(1 + ∆) · x(p(1 + ∆)) by Corollary 1
≤ p(x−w) − p∆w.
Thus φ− φ′ ≥ ∆wp = w(p′ − p) = w|p − p′|.
Case 2.1 : x ≤ 2w.
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Here w∆p = w · λpx−ww = λφ.
Case 2.2 : x ≥ 2w.
Here w∆p = w · λp = wx−wλp(x− w) = λ wx−wφ.
Remark. Changes of variable (and possibly consequent changes to the update rule) can allow
various other potential functions to be modified so as to have the form |x− w|p.
e.g. 1. φ′ = |x˜α − w˜α|p˜β , with α, β > 0; setting x = x˜α, w = w˜α, p = p˜β, yields φ′ = φ = |x− w|p.
2. φ′ = max{ x˜w˜ , w˜x˜ }p˜; setting p = p˜, x = log x˜, w = log w˜, yields log φ′ = φ = |x − w|p. The
formulation using φ seems more natural, since φ(w,w, p) = 0 while φ′(w,w, p) = 1.
3. φ′ = (x˜− w˜)2p˜; setting φ′′ = √φ′ = |x˜− w˜|√p˜ yields an instance of example 1.
3.2 Multiple Goods
Notation.
1. Let ∆ipi = p
′
i − pi denote the change to pi due to its update.
2. Let ∆ixj = x
′
j − xj denote the change to xj due to the update to pi. (Recall that x′j denotes
xj(p−i, p
′
i).)
3. Let Ii denote wi|∆ipi|.
4. Let (p−i, p
′
i) denote the price vector p with the ith price replaced by p
′
i.
5. For all j, let Γiφj = φj(p−i, pi)−φj(p−i, p′i) denote the reduction in φj when pi is updated. This
may be negative for j 6= i. In addition, let Γiφ =
∑
j Γiφj ; this is the reduction to φ when pi is
updated.
By Lemma 1, Γiφi is at least Ii = wi|∆ipi| = λpiwimin{ |xi−wi|wi , 1} = λφi ·min{1,
wi
|xi−wi|
}.
To achieve a similar rate of progress as in the 1-d case, as we will see, it will suffice to assume
that Property 1 below holds.
Definition 10. The update p′i is said to be toward wi if |xi(p−i, p′i)− wi| < |xi(p−i, pi)− wi|.
Property 1. When p′i is a same-side update toward wi,
∑
j 6=i |Γiφj | + αIi ≤ Γiφi, for some α,
0 < α ≤ 1.
The term on the RHS is the reduction in φi. The sum on the LHS is the the sum of the changes
to the φj, j 6= i, which are assumed, in a worst-case way, to all be increases (which is possible with
certain wj, namely wj > xj > x
′
j or wj < xj < x
′
j). The second term on the LHS is the desired
reduction in φi. In the 1-d case the reduction was by at least Ii; here we relax this to provide more
flexibility.
Lemma 7. If Property 1 holds, then when p′i is given by a same-side toward wi update, Γiφ ≥ αIi.
Proof. Γiφ =
∑
j Γiφj ≥ Γiφi −
∑
j 6=i |Γiφj | ≥ αIi.
Next, we show that the standard assumption of weak gross substitutes (WGS) in Fisher markets
implies Property 1 with α = 1. This claim is shown in Lemma 9, below.
Definition 11. Let price pi change to pi + ∆ipi. The corresponding spending neutral change to
demand for good i, ∆Ni xi, is given by:
pixi = (pi +∆ipi)(xi +∆
N
i xi). (6)
21
In the following lemma we show that given a same side update toward wi, the corresponding
spending neutral change to xi decreases φi by wi|∆ipi| = Ii.
Lemma 8. 1. If xi > xi +∆
N
i xi ≥ wi, then ∆ipi > 0 and
pi(xi − wi)− (pi +∆ipi)(xi +∆Ni xi − wi) = wi∆ipi = Ii.
2. If xi < xi +∆
N
i xi ≤ wi, then ∆ipi < 0 and
pi(wi − xi)− (pi +∆ipi)(wi − xi −∆Ni xi) = −wi∆ipi = wi|∆ipi| = Ii.
Proof. We show the first claim. By (6),
pi(xi − wi)− (pi +∆ipi)(xi +∆Ni xi − wi) = −piwi + (pi +∆ipi)wi = wi∆ipi.
Note that ∆ipi > 0 as ∆
N
i xi < 0.
The proof of the second claim is similar.
Lemma 9. If all demands obey WGS, then Property 1 holds with α = 1.
Proof. We begin by showing that
∑
j 6=i Γiφj =
∑
j 6=i pj∆ixj = pixi − (pi +∆pi)(xi +∆ixi). This
follows from
∑
j pjxj = (pi +∆pi)(xi +∆ixi) +Σj 6=ipj(xj +∆ixj), which holds because when pi is
updated, the combined total spending on all the goods is unchanged.
Next we show that Γiφi = Ii +
∑
j 6=i pj|∆ixj |.
For the case xi > wi, we have:
Γiφi = φi(p−i, pi)− φi(p−i, p′i)
= pi(xi −wi)− (pi +∆ipi)(xi +∆ixi − wi)
(recall that a same-side update is being applied to pi)
= wi∆ipi + pixi − (pi +∆pi)(xi +∆ixi)
= Ii +
∑
j 6=i
pj∆ixj as ∆ipi > 0.
And ∆ixj ≥ 0 for j 6= i, as there is a price increase applied to pi, which by WGS only increases the
demand for good j, j 6= i. So Γiφi = Ii +
∑
j 6=i pj |∆ixj| in this case.
For the case xi < wi, φi(p−i, pi) = pi(wi − xi) and φi(p−i, p′i) = (pi + ∆ipi)(wi − xi − ∆i).
Running through the same algebra yields Γiφi = −wi∆ipi−
∑
j 6=i pj∆ixj = Ii+
∑
j 6=i pj|∆ixj|, for
in this case there is a price decrease applied to pi, which implies that ∆ixj ≤ 0 for j 6= i.
Finally, for j 6= i, we observe that:
|pj∆ixj | = |pj(xj +∆ixj −wj)− pj(xj − wj)|
=
{ |φj(p−i, p′i)− φj(p−i, pi)| if sign(xj − wj) = sign(xj +∆ixj − wj)
|φj(p−i, p′i) + φj(p−i, pi)| otherwise
≥ |φj(p−i, p′i)− φj(p−i, pi)| = |Γiφj|.
Hence Γiφi ≥
∑
j 6=i |Γiφj|+ Ii.
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This will not suffice when we seek to analyze multiple asynchronous updates to different prices.
The difficulty can be understood by considering the special case where all prices are updated
synchronously. One way to analyze this would be to apply the updates one by one in turn. The
difficulty we face is that it seems unreasonable to assume that each successive update is based on
xj values updated to take account of the previous price updates.
Instead, we will show that if we apply the updates one at a time using the price updates given
by the original xi values, then there is an ordering of the goods so that when the update to pi
occurs, sign(xi−wi) has not yet changed, nor does the update change it (though, possibly, it makes
xi = wi). Consequently, by Lemmas 7 and 9, the reduction to the potential φ due to the update to
pi (based on the value of xi prior to any of the updates) is at least Ii. Hence the reduction to φ is
at least
∑
i Ii.
To achieve this we will need λ(2E − 1) ≤ 12 . Note that this condition implies λE ≤ 12 as E ≥ 1.
The discussion is simplified by introducing the following function ψi.
Definition 12. ψi = pi(wi−xi), if xi < wi prior to the price updates; while if xi > wi prior to the
price updates, ψi = pi(xi − wi). We also define Γiψi, analogously to Γiφi; it denotes the decrease
to ψi due to the update to pi. More precisely, WLOG, suppose that the price updates are applied in
the order p1, p2, · · · , pn. Γiψi = ψi(p′1, · · · , p′i−1, pi, · · · , pn)− ψi(p′1, · · · , p′i, pi+1, · · · , pn).
Lemma 10. Suppose that the price updates are performed sequentially in some order. Consider a
point when the update to pi is about to occur. Let φ
I
i be the value of φi prior to any update, and
let ψ′i be the current value of ψi. Suppose further that despite price updates to the other goods,
ψ′i ≥ φIi /2. Then, assuming that λ(2E − 1) ≤ 12 , pi’s update (based on xi’s original value) is
toward wi and same-sided, and it reduces ψi = φi as follows: if ψ
′
i ≤ φIi , then Γiψi ≤ 12φIi , and
if ψ′i > φ
I
i , then Γiψi ≤ (ψ′i − φIi ) + 12φIi . In either case, ψi ≥ 0 right after the update. Further,
Γiφ ≥ Ii = wi|∆ipi|.
Proof. Case 1. xi < wi.
If Γiψi ≤ ψ′i, then ψi(p−i, p′i) ≥ 0 and consequently xi(p−i, p′i) ≤ wi, in which case the update is
same-sided; consequently ψi ≥ 0 right after the update. As ψi > 0 right before the update also,
ψi = φi, both right before and right after the update, so Γiψi = Γiφi. Further, by Lemmas 9 and
7, Γiφ ≥ Ii. Thus it suffices to show that Γiψi ≤ φIi /2, as we assume that ψ′i ≥ φIi /2.
Γiψi ≤ ψ′i −
[
pi
(
1 + λ
xi −wi
wi
)][
wi −
(
wi − ψ
′
i
pi
)(
1 + λ
xi −wi
wi
)−E]
≤ ψ′i − piwi + λpi(wi − xi) + (piwi − ψ′i)
(
1− λwi − xi
wi
)−(E−1)
≤ ψ′i − piwi + λφIi + (piwi − ψ′i)
(
1 + 2λ(E − 1)wi − xi
wi
)
applying Fact 1d, with a = −(E − 1), δ = −λwi−xiwi , ρ = 12 when E ≥ 2, and ρ = −12
when 1 ≤ E < 2; for when E ≥ 2, λ(E − 1)wi−xiwi ≤ 12 and when 1 ≤ E < 2, λ
wi−xi
wi
≤ 12 ;
further, in both cases, −(E − 1) ≤ 0.
≤ λφIi + 2λ(E − 1)pi(wi − xi)
≤ (2E − 1)λφIi ≤
φIi
2
as λ(2E − 1) ≤ 12 .
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Case 2. xi > wi.
Again, if Γiψi ≤ ψ′i, we can conclude that the update is same-sided, ψi ≥ 0 right after the update,
and Γiφ ≥ Ii. Again, this holds either if Γiψi ≤ φIi /2 (which holds when ψ′i ≤ φIi ) or if Γiψi ≤
φIi /2 + (ψ
′
i − φIi ) (which holds when ψ′i > φIi ).
Case 2.1. wi < xi ≤ 2wi.
Γiψi ≤ ψ′i −
[
pi
(
1 + λ
xi −wi
wi
)][(
wi +
ψ′i
pi
)(
1 + λ
xi − wi
wi
)−E
− wi
]
≤ ψ′i + piwi + λφIi − (piwi + ψ′i)
(
1 + λ
xi −wi
wi
)−(E−1)
≤ λφIi + λ(E − 1)
xi − wi
wi
(piwi + ψ
′
i)
applying Fact 1a, with a = −(E − 1) and δ = λxi−wiwi , as λ
xi−wi
wi
≤ 1 and −(E − 1) ≤ 0.
≤ λφIi + λ(E − 1)[(xi − wi)pi + ψ′i]
≤
{
λ(2E − 1)φIi if ψ′i ≤ φIi
λ(2E − 1)φIi + λ(E − 1)(ψ′i − φIi ) if ψ′i > φIi
≤
{
φIi /2 if ψ
′
i ≤ φIi
φIi /2 + (ψ
′
i − φIi ) if ψ′i > φIi
as λ(2E − 1) ≤ 12
Case 2.2. 2wi < xi.
Γiψi ≤ ψ′i − [pi(1 + λ)]
[(
wi +
ψ′i
pi
)
(1 + λ) −E − wi
]
≤ ψ′i + piwi(1 + λ)− (piwi + ψ′i)(1 + λ) −(E−1)
≤ λpiwi + λ(E − 1)(piwi + ψ′i)
applying Fact 1a, with a = −(E − 1) and δ = λ, as λ ≤ 1 and −(E − 1) ≤ 0.
≤ λEφIi + λ(E − 1)(2φIi + ψ′i − φIi ) as piwi ≤ pi(xi − wi) = φIi
≤ λ(2E − 1)φIi + λ(E − 1)(ψ′i − φIi )
≤ φIi /2 + (ψ′i − φIi ) as λ(2E − 1) ≤ 12 .
Lemma 11. When all the updates are applied, for at least one good, WLOG ga, either sign(xa − wa)
is unchanged or xa = wa now.
Proof. WLOG let g1, · · · , gi be the goods for which xh ≥ wh, h ≤ i, gi+1, · · · , gj those for which
xh = wh, i < h ≤ j, and gj+1, · · · , gn, the remaining goods, be those for which xh < wh, j < h ≤ n.
We show by induction that there is an ordering of the updates so that, for all i, just before an
update is applied to pi, ψ
′
i ≥ φIi /2; then, by Lemma 10, following the update to pi, ψi ≥ 0.
Case 1 φI1 + · · ·+ φIi ≤ φIj+1 + · · · + φIn.
Consider applying all the price updates for goods g1, · · · , gi. We argue that the update to price
ph leaves ψh ≥ φIh/2. For as the ultimate change to ψh is the same regardless of the order in which
the updates to p1, · · · , pi are applied, we will analyze the case in which ph is updated first: then
by Lemma 10, its update reduces ψh by at most φ
I
h/2; the updates to the other ph′ , h
′ ≤ i, price
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increases, by WGS only increase xh and hence ψh. We conclude that after the updates to p1, · · · , pi,
for every h ≤ i, ψh ≥ φIh/2.
Because the total spending is fixed, any reductions to ψl, l > j, result from matching reductions
to the ψh, h ≤ i. The total available reduction is at most 12
∑
h≤i φ
I
h ≤ 12
∑
l>j φ
I
l . Hence there is
some good gl, such that, after the updates to all of p1, · · · , pi, ψl ≥ φIl /2. WLOG let l = n.
Applying the updates to pj+1, · · · , pn−1 (price decreases) only decreases xn and hence only
increases ψn.
So the update to pn can be applied last and just before it is applied, ψn ≥ 12φIn. Thus we can
choose a = n.
Case 2 φI1 + · · ·+ φIi ≥ φIj+1 + · · · + φIn.
A symmetric argument applies here.
By induction, the claim applies to the remaining n− 1 goods.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the market obeys WGS and elasticity E. When all the prices are updated
simultaneously, if λ(2E − 1) ≤ 12 , φ =
∑
i φi reduces by at least
∑
i λφ
I
i min
{
1, wi|xi−wi|
}
. If the
demands satisfy xi ≤ dwi throughout, then φ reduces from φI to at most φF in O( 1λ(d− 1) log φIφF )
iterations.
Proof. Simply apply the updates in the order given by Lemma 11.
3.3 Asynchronous Price Updates with Bounded Demands
Recall that we use the following potential function: φ =
∑
i φi, where
φi(xi, xi, wi) = pi [span(xi, xi, wi)− α1λ|wi − xi|(t− τi)] , (7)
with α1 > 0 being a suitable constant and span(x, y, z) denoting the length of the interval spanned
by its arguments, i.e. max{x, y, z} −min{x, y, z}. At the end of this section we will relate φ to our
definition of misspending.
φi will decrease continuously: in Lemma 12, we will show that
dφi
dt ≤ −λφi. In Corollary 2, we
will also show that when the price update occurs, φ =
∑
i φi only decreases. Together, these imply
a daily decrease in potential by at least a 1− θ(λ) factor.
In fact, we will need a more elaborate potential to cope with the following scenario: suppose
that xi < wi and yet owing to last-minute price reductions to other goods xi ≫ wi. Then applying
the update to pi may increase φi well beyond the available “savings” of pi|wi − xi|. So for the
moment we assume that all demands are bounded at all times:
Assumption 1. xi ≤ dwi for all i, where d ≥ 2 is a suitable constant.
Later, we will show how to drop this assumption.
Lemma 12. If λα1 ≤ 12 , then dφidt ≤ −λα1pi span(xi, xi, wi) ≤ −λα1φi at any time when no price
update is occurring (to any pj); this bound also holds for the one-sided derivatives when a price
update occurs.
Proof. We begin by showing dxidt =
1
t−τi
(xi − xi). For xi = 1t−τi
∫ t
τi
xidt; so xi + (t− τi)dxidt = xi.
Now we bound dφidt .
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Case 1: xi ≥ xi ≥ wi (or symmetrically, xi ≤ xi ≤ wi). Then φ = pi[(xi − wi)(1− λα1(t− τi))].
dφi
dt
= pi
[ −1
t− τi (xi − xi) (1− λα1(t− τi))− λα1(xi − wi)
]
≤ −λα1pi(xi−wi) ≤ −λα1φi as t− τi ≤ 1.
Case 2: xi > xi ≥ wi (or symmetrically, xi < xi ≤ wi). Then φi = pi[(xi−wi)−λα1(t−τi)(xi−wi)].
dφi
dt
= −λα1pi [(xi − wi) + (xi − xi)] = −λα1pi(xi − wi) ≤ −λα1φi.
Case 3: xi > wi ≥ xi (or symmetrically, xi < wi ≤ xi). Then φi = pi[(xi−xi)−λα1(t−τi)(xi−wi)].
dφi
dt
= pi
[−(xi − xi)
t− τi − λα1((xi − wi) + (xi − xi))
]
≤ pi [−(xi − xi)− λα1(xi − wi)]
≤ −pi (1− λα1) (xi − xi) ≤ − (1− λα1)φi ≤ −λα1φi, as λα1 ≤ 1
2
.
Lemma 13.
1. If ∆ipi > 0,
−∆ixi
xi
≤ E∆ipi
pi
= λEmin
{
1,
xi − wi
wi
}
.
2. If ∆ipi < 0,
∆ixi
xi
≤ E(−∆ipi)
(1− λE)pi = −
λE
1− λE
(xi − wi)
wi
, if
λE
1− λE ≤ 1.
Proof. We begin with (1). By Lemma 5,
xi − (−∆ixi)
xi
≥
(
pi
pi +∆ipi
)E
=
(
1 +
∆ipi
pi
)−E
≥ 1− E∆ipi
pi
,
using Fact 1a, with a = E and δ = ∆ipipi , as
E∆ipi
pi
≥ −1.
(1) now follows readily.
For (2), by Lemma 5,
xi +∆ixi
xi
≤
(
pi
pi − (−∆ipi)
)E
=
(
pi − (−∆ipi)
pi
)−E
≤ 1 + E
1− λE
(−∆ipi)
pi
,
using Fact 1d, with a = −E, δ = ∆ipipi , and ρ = λE, as E(
(−∆ipi
pi
) ≤ Eλ.
(2) now follows readily.
Note that any non-same-side update can be split into two same-side updates: the first causes
xi = wi and the second changes xi to its final value. Consequently, we will analyze only same-side
updates henceforth. We say that the update of pi to p
′
i is toward wi if either xi > x
′
i ≥ wi or
xi < x
′
i ≤ wi, and it is away from wi if either x′i > xi ≥ wi or x′i < xi ≤ wi, where x′i = xi(p′i).
Let ψi = φi− span(xi, xui , wi)−α1λ|wi−xui |(t−τi), and let ∆iψi denote the increase in ψi when
pi is updated (this definition is useful in later sections where the definition of φi is changed with
the effect that ψi 6= 0). xui is the values of xi used in computing the price update; in this section,
xui = xi.
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Lemma 14. If Assumption 1 holds (xi ≤ dwi), when pi is updated, φ increases by at most the
following amount:
Case 1. the update is toward wi:
λα1|xui − wi|pi +∆iψi − wi|∆ipi|. (8)
Case 2. The update is away from wi:(
1 +
2Ed
1− λE
)
wi|∆ipi|+∆iψi − (1− λα1)pi|xui − wi|. (9)
Proof. Case 1: First, we increase ψi by ∆iψi.
Next, we reduce the term pi span(xi, x
u
i , wi) in φi to pi|xi − wi|. Following this, we update xi
to xi +∆
N
i xi and reduce pi|xi − wi| to (pi +∆ipi)|xi +∆Ni xi − wi|. By Lemma 8, this reduces φi
by wi|∆ipi|. We also remove the term λα1(t− τi)|xui − wi|pi from φi. The increase to φi following
these changes is at most
λα1(t− τi)|xui − wi|pi +∆iψi − wi|∆ipi|.
Note that t− τi ≤ 1, as there is a price update at least once a day; this yields the bound in (8) in
the statement of the Lemma.
Finally, we change xi by a further ∆ixi −∆Ni xi. This reduces φi by (pi +∆ipi)(∆ixi −∆Ni xi)
and may increase other φj by up to this amount (due to a transfer of this amount of spending from
the span term in φi to span terms in φj , j 6= i). At worst, this leaves the potential φ unchanged.
Case 2: First, we increase ψi by ∆iψi.
Next, we reduce pi span(xi, x
u
i , wi) to pi|xi − wi|. This yields a saving of pi|xui − wi|.
Again, we remove the term λα1pi(t−τi)|xui −wi|, with this cost. Next, we update pi to pi+∆ipi
and change xi by ∆
N
i xi. By Lemma 8, this increases φi by wi|∆ipi|. Then, we update xi by a
further ∆ixi−∆Ni xi. This increases φi by (pi+∆ipi)|∆ixi−∆Ni xi|. It may also cause up to an equal
increase in other φj due to matching spending transfers between good i and goods j 6= i. The net
increase in potential is bounded by wi|∆ipi|+2(pi+∆ipi)|∆xi|+λα1pi|xui −wi|+∆iψi−pi|xui −wi|.
Case 2.1: xi ≤ wi < xui .
Here 0 ≤ ∆ipi ≤ λpi. By Lemma 13, as ∆ipi ≥ 0, |∆ixi| ≤ xiE∆ipi/pi ≤ wiE(∆ipi)/pi. Also
∆ipi ≤ λpi. So the increase to φ is at most wi|∆ipi|+2pi(1+λ)wiE(∆ipi)/pi+λα1pi|xui −wi|+∆iψi−
pi|xui −wi|; on rearranging, this amounts to wi|∆ipi|(1 + 2E(1 + λ)) +∆iψi− (1− λα1)pi|xui −wi|.
This is bounded by (9).
Case 2.2: xi ≥ wi > xui .
Here ∆ipi ≤ 0; so pi + ∆ipi ≤ pi. By Lemma 13, |∆ixi| ≤ E1−λExi |∆ipi|pi ≤ E1−λE dwi
|∆ipi|
pi
. So the
increase to φ is at most wi|∆ipi| + 2pi · E1−λEdwi |∆ipi|pi + λα1pi|xui − wi| + ∆iψi − pi|xui − wi|; on
rearranging, this amounts to (9).
Corollary 2. If Assumption 1 holds (xi ≤ dwi), α1(d− 1) ≤ 1, and λα1 + λ( 2Ed1−λE + 1) ≤ 1 then
when pi is updated, φ only decreases.
Proof. Recall that ∆ipi = λmin{1, xi−wiwi }. Also note that ψi = 0 and hence ∆iψi = 0 too. Finally,
recall that xui = xi.
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Case 1: A toward wi update.
The increase in φ is bounded by (8).
If |xi − wi| ≤ wi, ∆ipi = λpi(xi − wi)/wi; for the increase to be non-positive, it suffices that
α1 ≤ 1.
If |xi − wi| > wi, then ∆ipi = λpi. Also |xi − wi| ≤ (d − 1)wi. Again, for the increase to be
non-positive, it suffices that α1(d− 1) ≤ 1.
Case 2: An away from wi update.
The increase in φ is bounded by (9). Again, ∆iψi = 0. Also, |∆ipi| ≤ piλ|xi − wi|/wi. For the
increase to be non-positive, it suffices that λα1 + λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE
)
≤ 1.
Theorem 3. Suppose that the market obeys WGS and has elasticity E. If xi ≤ dwi, for all i,
where d ≥ 2, α1(d− 1) ≤ 1, λα1 + λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE
)
≤ 1, and each price is updated at least once every
day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− λα12 factor daily. Hence φ reduces from φI to at most φF in
O( 1λα1 (d− 1) log
φI
φF
) days.
Proof. By Corollary 3, φ only decreases whenever a price update occurs. By Lemma 12, dφ/dt ≤
λα1φ, which implies φ(t+ 1) ≤ e−λα1φ(t) ≤ (1− λα12 )φ(t) as λα1 ≤ 1.
Remark. One could imagine having a distinct elasticity bound for each good, Ei for good i,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, say. Then we would use a distinct parameter λi for good i. To ensure uniform progress
in reducing the various φi, a price update for good i would need to occur every Θ(λif) time units,
where f is an upper bound on the time between updates for goods with elasticity 1. As this does
not alter the character of our results, we leave the details to the interested reader.
3.4 The Ongoing Market, or Incorporating Warehouses
We begin by showing that Constraint1 allows us to relate w˜i and wi.
Lemma 15. If Constraint 1 holds, then 34w˜i ≤ wi ≤ 32w˜i and |w˜i − wi| ≤ 12 w˜i. In addition,
Constraint 1 holds for all possible warehouse contents if κmax{|ci − s∗i |, s∗i } ≤ 13wi, and if in
addition s∗i = ci/2, the condition becomes κ ≤ 23 wici .
Proof. Constraint 1 implies 23wi ≤ w˜i ≤ 43wi. Thus 34 w˜i ≤ wi ≤ 32w˜i, which gives the first claim.
The second pair of claims is immediate from the definition of w˜i, as |si − s∗i | is maximized either
when si = ci or when si = 0.
We prove results analogous to Lemma 12 and Corollary 2 to demonstrate progress as before.
To enable us to apply the following lemma in later sections, we define χi =
dw˜i
dt +κ(xi−wi) (in the
current section, χi = 0).
Lemma 16. Suppose that 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 . If |w˜i − wi| ≤ 2 span(xi, xi, w˜i), then dφidt ≤
− λα14(1+α2)φi − piχi, and otherwise
dφi
dt ≤ −κ(α2−1)2 φi − piχi, at any time when no price update is
occurring (to any pj); this bound also holds for the one-sided derivatives when a price update occurs.
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Proof. The analysis builds on the proof for Lemma 12. Taking account of the two changes to the
previous form of the potential, we can conclude
dφi
dt
≤ −λα1pi span(xi, xi, w˜i) + [κ(xi − wi)− χi]pimax{(1 − λα1(t− τi)), λα1(t− τi)}
− κ(xi − wi)α2pi sign(w˜i − wi).
Case 1: |w˜i − wi| ≤ 2 span(xi, xi, w˜i).
Then |xi − wi| ≤ 3 span(xi, xi, w˜i). And
dφi
dt
≤ −λα1pi span(xi, xi, w˜i) + κpi(1 + α2)|xi − wi| − piχi
≤ −pi(λα1 − 3κ(1 + α2)) span(xi, xi, w˜i)− piχi
≤ −pi (λα1 − 3κ(1 + α2))
1 + α2
[span(xi, xi, w˜i) + α2|w˜i − wi|]− piχi
≤ −(λα1 − 3κ(1 + α2))
1 + α2
φi − piχi ≤ − λα1
4(1 + α2)
φi − piχi.
Case 2: |w˜i − wi| > 2 span(xi, xi, w˜i).
Then |w˜i − wi| ≤ 2|xi − wi|. And
dφi
dt
≤ −λα1pi span(xi, xi, w˜i)− κpi(α2 − 1)|xi − wi| − piχi
≤ −piλα1 span(xi, xi, w˜i)− κpi (α2 − 1)
2
|w˜i − wi| − piχi
≤ −min
{
λα1, κ
(α2 − 1)
2
}
φi − piχi ≤ −κ(α2 − 1)
2
φi − piχi.
Corollary 3. Suppose that 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 . If φ ≥ 2(1 + 2α2)
∑
i |w˜i − wi|pi, then dφdt ≤
− λα18(1+α2)φ−
∑
i piχi, and otherwise
dφ
dt ≤ −κ(α2−1)2 φ−
∑
i piχi, at any time when no price update
is occurring (to any pj); this bound also holds for the one-sided derivatives when a price update
occurs.
Proof. Let I = {i | |w˜i−wi| ≤ 2 span(xi, xi, w˜i)}. If φ ≥ 2(1 + 2α2)
∑
i |w˜i −wi|pi, then
∑
i∈I φi ≥
1
2φ. Thus
dφ
dt
≤
∑
i∈I
dφi
dt
−
∑
i/∈I
piχi
≤ − λα1
4(1 + α2)
∑
i∈I
φi −
∑
i
piχi
≤ − λα1
8(1 + α2)
φ−
∑
i
piχi.
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In Lemma 18 below, w˜i takes on the role of wi in Corollary 2. Accordingly, the bound of
xi ≤ dwi from Assumption 1 is replaced by a bound of xi ≤ dw˜i, which is ensured by the following
assumption.
Assumption 2. xi ≤ 23dwi for all i, where d ≥ 2.
Lemma 17. If Assumption 2 and Constraint 1 hold, then xi ≤ dw˜i.
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 15.
Lemma 18. If Constraint 1 holds and xi ≤ dw˜i, then when pi is updated, φ increases by at most
the following:
(i) With a toward w˜i update:
λα1|xi − w˜i|pi + 1
2
α2w˜i|∆ipi| − w˜i|∆ipi|. (10)
(ii) With an away from w˜i update:(
1 +
2Ed
1− λE
)
w˜i|∆ipi|+ 1
2
α2w˜i|∆ipi| − (1− λα1)pi|xi − w˜i|. (11)
Proof. We apply Lemma 14, with xui = xi and w˜i replacing wi, as here φi is defined in terms of
w˜i rather than wi. Also, now ψi = α2pi|w˜i − wi|. So ∆iψi = α2∆ipi|w˜i − wi|. By Lemma 15,
|w˜i − wi| ≤ w˜i/2, so ∆iψi ≤ α2|∆ipi|w˜i/2.
Corollary 4. If Constraint 1 holds and xi ≤ dw˜i, α22 + max{32 , (d − 1)}α1 ≤ 1, and λα1 +
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, then when pi is updated, φ only decreases.
Proof. Recall that by Lemma 17, xi ≤ (d− 1)w˜i.
Case 1: An update toward wi:
The increase in φ is is bounded by (10).
(i) |xi − w˜i| ≤ wi.
∆ipi = λpi(xi − w˜i)/wi, and by Lemma 15 wi ≤ 32w˜i. Thus for the increase to be non-positive,
3
2α1 +
1
2α2 ≤ 1 suffices.
(ii) |xi − w˜i| ≥ wi.
As |xi−w˜i| ≤ (d−1)w˜i and |∆ipi| = λpi, for the increase to be non-positive, α1(d−1)+ 12α2 ≤ 1
suffices.
Case 2: An update away from wi:
The increase in φ is is bounded by (11). As ∆ipi ≤ λpi|xi − w˜i|/wi, for the increase to be
non-positive, the condition w˜iwiλ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1− λα1 suffices. By Lemma 15, w˜i ≤ 43wi, so
the condition of the previous sentence is subsumed by λα1 +
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1.
Theorem 4. If Constraint 1 holds and xi ≤ dw˜i, α22 +α1max{32 , (d−1)} ≤ 1, λα1+43λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤
1, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 , κ(α2−1)2 ≤ 1, and each price is updated at least once every day, then φ
decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)4 factor daily.
In fact, if φ ≥ 2(1+ 2α2)
∑
i |w˜i−wi|pi, then φ decreases by at least a 1− λα18(1+α2) factor daily.
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Proof. By Corollary 4, φ only decreases whenever a price update occurs. By Lemma 16, dφ/dt ≤
−κ(α2−1)2 φ, as χi = 0 for all i, which implies φ(t + 1) ≤ e−
κ(α2−1)
2 φ(t) ≤ (1 − κ(α2−1)4 )φ(t) as
κ(α2−1)
2 ≤ 1, arguing as in the proof of Lemma 3.
The second claim is shown in exactly the same way.
3.5 Bounds on Demands and Prices
Next, we determine an f -bound on prices given that they are c-demand bounded. To obtain this
we need to assume a bounded elasticity of wealth E′ = 0. Recall that when this holds demands are
called normal.
Definition 13. For c ≥ 1, define r(c) = maxi p∗i /p(c)i and r(1/c) = maxi p(1/c)i /p∗i .
Notation. Let ρ = maxi,j
wip
∗
i
wjp∗j
.
Lemma 19. r(1/c) ≤ cnρ.
Proof. Let h = argmaxiwip
∗
i . Then the money Ma spent at equilibrium is at most nwhp
∗
h. Let
k = argmaxi p
(1/c)
i /p
∗
i . The money Mb spent on good k at prices p
(1/c) is 1cwkp
(1/c)
k . By WGS,
Mb ≤Ma. But
1
c
r(1/c)wkp
∗
k =
1
c
wkp
(1/c)
k = Mb ≤Ma ≤ nwhp∗h.
so r(1/c) ≤ cnwhp
∗
h
wkp
∗
k
≤ cnρ.
Obtaining a bound on r(c) for c ≥ 1 entails a more elaborate argument.
Consider the following process for decreasing prices from from p∗ to p(c), whereWLOG p∗1/p
(c)
1 ≥
p∗2/p
(c)
2 ≥ · · · ≥ p∗n/p(c)n .
Begin by decreasing all prices uniformly, until pn reaches p
(c)
n . Continue reducing all prices
except pn uniformly until pn−1 reaches p
(c)
n−1, and so forth. Call this the uniform price reduction
process (UPR for short).
Lemma 20. r(c) is maximized when demand increases as follows, as the UPR is applied. During
the reduction of pn from p
∗
n to p
(c)
n only xn changes (by increasing to cwn). In general, during the
reduction of pi from p
∗
i p
(c)
i+1/p
∗
i+1 to p
(c)
i , only xi changes.
Loosely speaking, the demands increase one time.
Proof. By normality, for those goods whose prices are decreasing during the UPR, demand either
stays the same or is increased.
To maximize the price reduction goods 1, · · · , n − 1 can achieve one needs to minimize the
amount of money spent on them. This implies that p
(c)
n needs to be as large as possible, which
occurs if all the increase in demand goes to good n as the UPR proceeds, in going from pn to p
(c)
n .
By induction, all other demands are increased as specified in the lemma.
Lemma 21. r(c) ≤ c(ρn)(c−1).
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Proof. By Lemma 20, the price drop is maximized if demands increase one at a time. So consider
the initial price drop in which the price of the first good increases. Now imagine dividing this good
into two goods, with their demands increasing in sequence. This only increases the maximum price
drop. We iterate this process ad infinitum, leading to a continuous process which we express as
follows.
By rescaling if needed, we imagine that all goods have the same equilibrium price. Note that
this is now a continuum of goods. As the prices are multiplied by a factor s < 1 (a decrease), we
track a measure W (s), the quantity of goods whose demand has not yet changed. W (1)−W (s) is
the quantity of goods whose demand has grown by a factor of c. We can express W as a differential
process.
Consider decreasing s to s− ds. Suppose this results in dW of the goods having demand grow
by a factor of c. Assuming the total spending on goods does not increase (this maximizes the price
drop), Ws = (W − dW )(s − ds) + cdW (s − ds). To first order, Wds = (c − 1)sdW , which yields
W
(c−1)s =
dW
ds or W = W (1)s
1/(c−1).
To get back to the discrete process, the price reduction is stopped when W is reduced to
W (1)/ρn, for this is a lower bound on the amount of good k with k = argminj wj .
Good k has a further price drop of no more than a factor of c to bring its demand to cwk.
The maximum possible price reduction in reducing W to W (1)/ρn occurs when s1/(c−1) =
1/(ρn). Thus r(c) ≤ c/s ≤ c(ρn)(c−1).
Lemma 4 follows immediately from Lemmas 20 and 21.
3.6 Faster Updates with Large Demands
Our previous analysis in Lemma 18 (see Lemma 14 also) uses the assumption xi ≤ dw˜i in Case
2. This in used in the following scenario: xi increases from less than w˜i to much more than w˜i
between two successive updates to pi. The price update (a decrease) could then increase the overall
potential. However, with our new price update rule, as xi is then large, this price decrease will
be followed quickly by several price increases. These more than undo the just mentioned potential
increase.
To analyze this, the potential ‘pretends’ that the troublesome price decrease did not occur yet,
by delaying its instantiation in one of two ways: either this price decrease is combined with the next
one or two price increases so that the net effect is no change or a price increase, or the potential
instantiates the price update when next x′i ≤ (d − 1)w˜i, whichever occurs sooner, where x′i is the
value of xi resulting from the delayed price updates. All other price changes continue as before by
their previous amounts.
We need some significant changes to the potentials. For goods i that do not have a delayed
price increase currently, we define
φi = ψ
r
i = pi
[
span(x′i, x
′
i, w˜i)− λα1(t− τi)|x′i − w˜i|+ [1− λα1(t− τi)]
∫ t
τi
(x′i − xi)dt+ α2|w˜i − wi|
]
,
where x′i is the average value of x
′
i since time τi. Note that by WGS, x
′
i ≥ xi since there is no
delayed update to pi in this case. (The superscript r on ψ denotes regular or non-delayed updates.)
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For goods i with a currently delayed update, we define
φ′i = ψ
d
i = pi
[
span(x′i, dw˜i, w˜i) + (w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )) [1− λα1(t− τi)]− λα1
∫ t
τsi
(x′i − w˜i)dt+ α2|w˜i − wi|
]
− pi
[
λE
1− λE [w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )]
∫ t
τsi
x′i
wi
dt
]
where τ si is the time at which the delayed price decrease occurred in reality. (The superscript d on
ψ denotes delayed.)
Next, we bound x′i − xi.
Lemma 22. Suppose that the market has bounded wealth elasticity E′ and bounded demand elas-
ticity E. Let q and p be price vectors with qj = (1− λ)pj for all j 6= i, and and qi = pi. Then,
xi(q) ≥ (1− λ)E+E′xi(p).
Proof. Consider prices q′(j) = p(j)(1 − λ) for all j. Then, by the bound on wealth elasticity,
xi(q
′) ≥ (1 − λ)E′xi(p). Increasing the price q′(i) to p(i) decreases xi by at most (1 − λ)E . So
xi(q) ≥ (1− λ)E′(1 + λ)−E1xi(p) ≥ (1− λ)E+E′xi(p).
Lemma 23. x′i ≤
(
1 + λ(E+E
′)
1−λ(E+E′)
)
xi, if λ(E + E
′) < 1.
Proof. We apply the bound from Lemma 22. Let p denote the actual prices, q the prices as defined
in Lemma 22, and q′ the prices where the delayed updates have not been performed. Now, for each
j, the delayed update to pj is a decrease by at most a 1 − λ factor, so qj ≤ q′j ≤ pj, ofr j 6= i. At
prices q the demand for good i is at least x′i(1 − λ)E+E
′
, by Lemma 22. Increasing prices qj to
q′j, for j 6= i, only increases the demand for good i. Reducing q′i = pi to qi also only increases the
demand for good i. Thus xi = xi(p) ≥ (1 − λ)E+E′xi(q) = (1 − λ)E+E′xi(q′) = (1 − λ)E+E′x′i; or,
x′i ≤ (1− λ)−(E+E
′)xi ≤
(
1 + λ(E+E
′)
1−λ(E+E′)
)
xi, by Fact 1(d) with ρ = λ(E + E
′).
Notation. Let E′′ denote E′ + E.
The following lemma bounds how long a price update can be delayed until it is instantiated in
the potential function.
Lemma 24. If d ≥ 5, and λE′′ ≤ 14 then the instantiation of a price update to pi is delayed by at
most one day, and it is instantiated by the time of the second subsequent price increase to pi. (If
the net effect of the price increase following the delayed decrease is to leave the price unchanged,
this is considered the performing of the price update.)
Proof. While the instantiation of update is being delayed, by Lemma 23, xi ≥ (1 − λE′′)x′i >
(1 − λE′′)(d − 1)w˜i. Hence, there has been an excess demand of at least 2wi after a time period
of at most 2wi(1−λE′′)(d−1)w˜i ≤
3
(1−λE′′)(d−1) ≤ 1 day, as w˜i ≥ 23wi by Lemma 15; thus two price
increases to pi will occur in this time. The net change to pi is a multiplicative increase of at least
(1− λ)(1 + λ)2 ≥ 1 as λ ≤ λE ≤ 14 . Consequently, no later than the second price increase, the net
change to the prices is instantiated.
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Lemma 25. When pi receives its delayed update, φi only decreases if d ≥ 5, 1 ≤ α2 ≤ 2,[
1− 2λα1 − 3λE
1− λE
(
1 +
λE′′
1− λE′′
)]
≥ 4
3
λ
[
2(d − 1) E
1 − λE + 1
]
, (12)
λ(
2
3
− η − ηλ)
(
1− 1
3
α2
)
≥ λα1
(
3
(
λE′′
1− λE′′ + 1
)
− 2
3
)
, (13)
with
η =
λα1
(
3
(
λE′′
1−λE′′ + 1
)
− 23
)
4
3λ
[
2(d − 1) E1−λE + 1
] . (14)
This holds if d = 5, λE, λE′′ ≤ 117 , α1 ≤ 15 , and α2 = 32 .
Proof. By Lemma 24, this update occurs within one day of its actual time, and no later than
the second subsequent price increase. So when the update occurs,
∫ t
τsi
(xi − wi)dt ≤ 2wi. Hence∫ t
τsi
xi ≤ 3wi. Now,∫ t
τsi
x′idt ≤
∫ t
τsi
xi
(
1 +
λE′′
1− λE′′
)
dt (using Lemma 23)
≤ 3
(
1 +
λE′′
1− λE′′
)
wi.
Thus,
ψid ≥ pi
[
span(x′i, dw˜i, w˜i) + [w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )]
[
1− 2λα1 − 3λE
1− λE
(
1 +
λE′′
1− λE′′
)]
−λα1
(
3
(
λE′′
1− λE′′ + 1
)
− 2
3
)
wi + α2|w˜i −wi|
]
as (t− τi) ≤ 2.
We need to show that this expression is at least as large as the potential following the update.
Note that after the update φi = (pi+∆ipi)[(x
′
i +∆ix
′
i− w˜i) +α2|w˜i −wi|]. Of course, some of the
φj , j 6= i, may also change as a result of the update.
Case 1: x′i = (d− 1)w˜i.
Then the original price update, a decrease, is applied at this moment. First, the span term is
reduced by w˜i to x
′
i − w˜i, reducing the potential by piw˜i ≥ 23piwi (by Lemma 15). The term
−piλα1
(
3
(
λE′′
1−λE′′ + 1
)
− 23
)
wi is also removed. As λα1 ≤ 19 and λE′′ ≤ 12 , this is a net reduction.
Now, an analysis similar to that of Case 2.1 in Lemma 14 can be applied, as follows. First, we
update pi to pi +∆ipi, and increase x
′
i by a spending neutral change to x
′
i +∆nx
′
i. By Lemma 13
(with w˜i replacing wi), this adds w˜i∆ipi to the term pi(x
′
i − w˜i) in φi. Next, we further increase
x′i to its final value x
′
i + ∆ixi, which increases the potentials φi and φj for j 6= i by at most
2(pi + ∆ipi)x
′
i
[
(1− ∆ipipi )−E − 1
]
≤ 2(d − 1)w˜i · E1−λE∆ipi, using Fact 1(d) with ρ = E1−λE (recall
that ρ < 1 suffices). The update leaves φ no larger if
pi[w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )]
[
1− 2λα1 − 3λE
1− λE
(
1 +
λE′′
1− λE′′
)]
≥ λ
[
2(d− 1) E
1 − λE w˜i∆ipi + w˜i∆ipi
]
.
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(Note that the term involving α2 only decreases as the update is a price decrease.) But |∆ipi| ≤
λ[w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )]pi/wi. So it suffices that (12) holds (using Lemma 15 to bound w˜i/wi by 43 ).
Case 2: x′i > (d− 1)w˜i.
The price update in this case is an increase.
Case 2.1: w˜i − xi(τ si ) ≥ ηwi.
If
η
[
1− 2λα1 − 3λE
1− λE
(
1 +
λE′′
1− λE′′
)]
≥ λα1
(
3
(
λE′′
1− λE′′ + 1
)
− 2
3
)
, (15)
then
ψdi ≥ pi[span(x′i, dw˜i, w˜i) + α2|w˜i − wi|]. (16)
Note that the definition of η in (14) makes (15) equivalent to (12).
Now, we proceed as in the analysis of Case 1 of Lemma 14. We start by reducing the span
term to x′i − w˜i. Next, we update pi to pi +∆ipi, and decrease x′i by a spending neutral change to
x′i +∆nx
′
i. By Lemma 13, this decreases φi by ∆ipiw˜i. Finally, we further decrease x
′
i to its final
value x′i+∆ixi; this only reduces φi and possibly increases the other φj by up to an equal amount.
Thus the overall change to φ is only a decrease if ∆ipiw˜i ≥ ∆ipiα2|w˜i − wi|. On applying Lemma
15, we see that 23 ≥ 13α2 suffices, i.e. α2 ≤ 2.
Case 2.2: w˜i − xi(τ si ) < ηwi.
Then, ψdi ≥ pi
[
span(x′i, dw˜i, w˜i)− 3λα1
(
3
(
λE′′
1− λE′′ + 1
)
− 2
3
)
wi + α2|w˜i − wi|
]
. (17)
We proceed as in Case 2.1. As there, the drop in the first term is at least w˜i∆pi, and we need
w˜i∆pi ≥ λα1piwi
(
3
(
λE′′
1− λE′′ + 1
)
− 2
3
)
+
1
3
α2wi∆pi.
Since w˜i(τ
s
i ) − xi(τ si ) ≤ ηwi, the delayed price reduction was by at most a factor of (1 − ηλ).
The next (current) price increase is by a factor of (1 + λ), yielding a net increase of at least
(1 + λ)(1− ηλ) ≥ 1 + (1− η)λ− ηλ2 ≥ 1 + λ(1− η − ηλ).
So it suffices that (13) holds.
Lemma 26. If 2λα1 ≤ 1, at the original time of a price decrease to good i,
φi ≥ pi
[
span(x′i, xi, w˜i)− λα1(t− τi)|xi − w˜i|+ α2|w˜i − wi|
]
.
Proof. At the original time of the update, φi = ψ
r
i . And∫ t
τi
(x′i − xi)dt = (x′i − xi)(t− τi).
Thus,
ψri = pi
[
span(x′i, x
′
i, w˜i)− λα1(t− τi)|x′i − w˜i|+ (x′i − xi) [1− λα1(t− τi)] + α2|w˜i − wi|
]
.
Case 1: x′i ≤ w˜i.
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Recall that x′i ≥ xi. Then span(x′i, x′i, w˜i) + (x′i − xi) ≥ span(x′i, xi, ww˜i) and λα1|x′i − w˜i| +
λα1(x
′
i − xi) = λα1(w˜i − xi). So ψri ≥ pi[span(x′i, xi, w˜i) − λα1(t − τi)(w˜i − xi)]. The claim holds
in this case.
Case 2: x′i > w˜i.
Note that xi < w˜i as there is supposed to be a price decrease at this time. So,
span(x′i, x
′
i, w˜i) + (w˜i − xi)[1− λα1(t− τi)] ≥ span(x′i, xi, w˜i))− λα1(t− τi)(w˜i − xi).
And
−[1−λα1(t−τi)](w˜i−xi)−λα1(t−τi)(x′i−w˜i)+(x′i−xi)[1−λα1(t−τi)] = [1−2λα1(t−τi)](x′i−w˜i) ≥ 0.
Thus
ψri ≥ pi[span(x′i, xi, w˜i)− λα1(t− τi)(w˜i − xi) + α2|w˜i −wi|].
The claim holds in this case too.
Corollary 5. If 2λα1 ≤ 1, at the original time of a delayed price increase, ψri ≥ ψdi .
Proof. Note that as the price increase is delayed, x′i ≥ dw˜i > w˜i. By Lemma 26,
ψri ≥ pi
[
span(x′i, xi, w˜i)− λα1(t− τi)|xi − w˜i|+ α2|w˜i − wi|
]
= pi
[|x′i − w˜i|+ |w˜i − xi| − λα1(t− τi)|xi − w˜i|(t− τi) + α2|w˜i − wi|] .
Note that at this time, t = τ si , and this expression in ψ
d
i .
We restate Lemma 14 with xi replaced by x
′
i, wi replaced by w˜i, and x
u
i = xi. Note that as in
Lemma 18, ψi = α2pi|w˜i − wi|.
Lemma 27. If Constraint 1 holds and x′i ≤ dw˜i, then when pi is updated, φ increases by at most
the following:
(i) With a toward w˜i update:
λα1|xi − w˜i|pi + 1
2
α2w˜i|∆ipi| − w˜i|∆ipi|. (18)
(ii) With an away from w˜i update:(
1 +
2Ed
1− λE
)
w˜i|∆ipi|+ 1
2
α2w˜i|∆ipi| − (1− λα1)pi|xi − w˜i|. (19)
Lemma 28. If Constraint 1 holds and x′i ≤ dw˜i, α22 + max{32 , (d − 1)}α1 ≤ 1, and λα1 +
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, and if pi is updated at the regular time, then ψri only decreases.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Corollary 4.
Our next goal is to show dφdt ≤ −Θ(κ)φ. We begin with two technical claims.
Lemma 29. If λE1−λE < 1, xi − x′i ≤ λE
′′
1−λE′′ [w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )] x
′
i
wi
and xi ≤
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
x′i.
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Proof. We seek to upper bound xi/x
′
i. Starting from the prices with delayed updates yielding
demand x′i, if one updated pj, j 6= i, this would only decrease the demand for good i. So the
only price change that increases the demand for good i is the update to pi, which is by a 1 −
λmin{1, [w˜i(τ si )−xi(τ si )]/wi} factor. Thus, by bounded elasticity, for a good i with a delayed price
update:
xi
x′i
≤
[
1
1− λmin{1, [w˜i(τ si )− xi(τ si )]/wi)}
]−E
≤ 1 + λE
1− λE min{1, [w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )]/wi}
applying Fact 1(d) with ρ =
λE
1− λE .
So, xi − x′i ≤ λE1−λE min{x′i, [w˜i(τ si )− xi(τ si )]
x′i
wi
}. The claims follow.
Lemma 30. ∑
i:delayed update
pi(xi − x′i) ≥
∑
i:undelayed update
pi(x
′
i − xi).
Proof. Consider the change in spending that would occur were all the delayed price updates (de-
creases) to be made. This can only reduce the amount of money being held. Thus:∑
i:delayed update
(pi +∆ipi)xi − pix′i +
∑
i:undelayed update
pi(xi − x′i) ≥ 0,
where ∆ipi < 0 for each delayed update. The claim follows.
Notation: Let spani = span(x
′
i, x
′
i, w˜i).
Lemma 31. Let ν = min
{
λα1(d−2)
2(d−1)+α2
, κ(α2−1)2
}
. If d ≥ 5, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 ,
and κ
(
d− 1 + α2
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
d−1
d−2
)
≤ 12λα1, then ddtφ ≤ −νφ.
Proof. We will show that
(i)
dψri
dt
≤ −κ(α2 − 1)
2
ψri + (x
′
i − xi)pi,
and (ii)
dψdi
dt
≤ − λα1(d− 2)
2(d− 1) + α2ψ
d
i − (xi − x′i)pi.
Summing over all i, and then applying Lemma 30, we conclude that
dψ
dt
≤ −νψ −
∑
i:delayed update
pi(xi − x′i) +
∑
i:undelayed update
pi(x
′
i − xi)
≤ −νψ.
Next, we show (i). Let ψ˜ri = pi[spani−λα1(t− τi)|x′i − w˜i|+ α2|w˜i − wi|].
Lemma 16 shows that
dψ˜ri
dt
≤ −κ(α2 − 1)
2
ψ˜ri
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for ψ˜ri is obtained from ψ
r
i by replacing xi with x
′
i in the function φi used in Lemma 16 and having
χi = 0 there. Now,
dψri
dt
=
dψ˜ri
dt
+ pi
[
−λα1
∫ t
τsi
(x′i − xi)dt+ [1− λα1(t− τi)](x′i − xi)
]
.
As x′i ≥ xi, (i) follows.
We show (ii) next.
dψdi
dt
≤ pi
[
(d− 1)κ|xi −wi| − λα1[w˜i(τ si )− xi(τ si )]− λα1(x′i − w˜i) + α2κ|xi − wi|
]
− pi
(
1 +
λE
1− λE
)
[w˜i(τ
s
i )− xi(τ si )]
x′i
wi
.
Next, we bound (d − 1 + α2)κ|xi − wi| by 12λα1(x′i − w˜i). By Lemma 29, xi ≤
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
x′i.
Recall that x′i ≥ (d−1)w˜i, and so xi ≤
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
[(x′i−w˜i)+w˜i] ≤
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
(1+ 1d−2)(x
′
i−w˜i) =(
1 + λE1−λE
)
d−1
d−2(x
′
i−w˜i). As κ(d−1+α2)
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
d−1
d−2 ≤ 12λα1, if xi ≥ wi, (d−1+α2)κ|xi−wi| ≤
1
2λα1(x
′
i− w˜i); otherwise, if xi < wi, (d− 1+α2)κ|xi−wi| ≤ (d− 1+α2)κwi ≤ 32(d− 1+α2)κw˜i ≤
3
2(d−2) (d− 1 + α2)κ(x′i − w˜i) ≤ 12λα1(x′i − w˜i). Thus
dψdi
dt
≤ −λα1[w˜i(τ si )− xi(τ si )]−
1
2
λα1(x
′
i − w˜i)− (xi − x′i).
As x′i ≥ (d−1)w˜i, span(x′i, dw˜i, w˜i) ≤ d−1d−2(x′i− w˜i). Similarly, α2|w˜i−wi| ≤ 12α2w˜i ≤ 12(d−2)α2(x′i−
w˜i). It follows that span(x
′
i, dw˜i, w˜i) + α2|w˜i − wi| ≤
[
d−1
d−2 +
α2
2(d−2)
]
(x′i − w˜i). Thus
dψdi
dt
≤ (d− 2)
2(d− 1) + α2)λα1ψ
d
i − (xi − x′i).
Theorem 5. If Constraint 1 holds, d = 5, α2 =
3
2 , λE
′′ ≤ 117 , α1 ≤ 116 , λα1+ 43λ
(
7
4 +
10E
1−λE
)
≤ 1,
κ ≤ loa13 , and each price is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1 − ν
factor daily, where ν = min
{
λα1(d−2)
2(d−1)+α2
, κ(α2−1)2
}
.
Proof. By Lemmas 25 and 28, φ only decreases whenever a price update occurs. By Lemma 31,
dφ/dt ≤ −νφ, which implies φ(t + 1) ≤ e−νφ(t) ≤ (1 − ν2 )φ(t) as ν ≤ 12 . On substitution of
the values and bounds for d, α2, λE, λE
′′α1, the constraints
α2
2 + α1max{32 , (d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 , κ
(
d− 1 + α2
(
1 + λE1−λE
)
d−1
d−2
)
≤ 12λα1, from
Lemmas 25 , 28 and 31, reduce to the constraints stated in the current lemma.
Finally, we relate the potential to the misspending.
Notation. Let Si = pi(|xi − w˜i|+ |xi − w˜i|) + pi|w˜i −wi|; this is called be the misspending on the
ith good. SO S =
∑
i Si; this is the total misspending.
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Lemma 32. S = O(φ) = O(S +M), where M is the daily supply of money.
Proof. We observe that ψri = θ
(
pi
[
span(x′i, x
′
i, w˜i) +
∫ t
τi
(x′i − xi)dt+ α2|w˜i −wi|
])
, and
ψdi = θ(span(x
′
i, dw˜i, w˜i) + α2|w˜i − wi|). The first bound follows from the fact that λα1 ≤ 12 .
For the second bound, we argue as in the proof of Lemma 25. As no update has been applied,
x′i > (d−1)w˜i, so Case 2 applies. In Case 2.1 the claim is immediate by (16). In Case 2.2 the claim
follows from (17), as 3λα1
(
3
(
λE
1−λE + 1
)
− 23
)
wi ≤ w˜i ≤ 12 span(x′i, dw˜i, w˜i).
Now, we bound S.
The following observation will be used twice: for a good i with a delayed update,
xi − x′i ≤
λE
1− λEx
′
i ≤
λE
1− λE
d− 1
d− 2(x
′
i − w˜i). (20)
This follows by using Lemma 29 for the second inequality, and the bound x′i > (d − 1)w˜i for the
third.
Note that for a good i with a delayed price update, Si = θ[(x
′
i − w˜i)pi + pi|w˜i − wi|] = θ(ψdi ),
for if xi ≥ w˜i, xi − w˜i ≤ (xi − x′i) + (x′i − w˜i) ≤ λE1−λE d−1d−2(x′i − w˜i) + (x′i − w˜i), using(20); while if
xi < w˜i, then w˜i − xi ≤ w˜i ≤ x′i − w˜i.
For a good i with an up to date price, define
Si = O(span(xi, xi, w˜i)pi + α2pi|w˜i − wi|)
= O(span(x′i, x
′
i, w˜i)pi + pi(x
′
i − xi) + pi(x′i − xi) + α2pi|w˜i − wi|)
= O(span(x′i, x
′
i, w˜i)pi +
∫ t
τi
pi(x
′
i − xi)dt+ α2pi|w˜i − wi|+ pi(x′i − xi))
= O(ψri + pi(x
′
i − xi)).
Now, by Lemma 30 for the first inequality, and (20) for the second,∑
i update not delayed
pi(x
′
i − xi) ≤
∑
i update delayed
pi(xi − x′i)
≤
∑
i delayed
pi
λE
1− λE
d− 1
d− 2(x
′
i − w˜i)
= O(
∑
i
ψdi ).
Thus S =
∑
i Si = O(
∑
i φi) = O(φ).
Finally, we bound φ.
ψdi = O(x
′
i − w˜i) + α2pi|w˜i − wi|)
≤ O(pi(xi − w˜i) + α2pi|w˜i − wi|+ pi(x′i − xi))
= O(Si + pixi) using Lemma 23.
So
∑
i ψ
d
i = O(S +
∑
i pixi) = O(S +M).
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ψri = O
(
pi span(x
′
i, x
′
i, w˜i) + α2pi|w˜i − wi|) + pi
∫ t
τi
(x′i − xi)dt
)
= O(pi span(xi, xi, w˜i) + α2pi|w˜i − wi|) + pi(x′i − xi) + pi(x′i − xi))
= O(Si + pix
′
i + pix
′
i) using Lemma 23.
So
∑
i ψ
r
i = O(S +
∑
i pix
′
i + pix
′
i) = O(S +M).
3.7 Bounds on Warehouse Sizes
We begin with two technical lemmas which show that (i) if a warehouse is rather full and the price
does not decrease too much henceforth then the warehouse eventually becomes significantly less
full, and (ii) an analogous result for the event that a warehouse is rather empty.
Let α4 = mini
κci
8wi
. Recall that w˜i − wi = κ(si − s∗i ). Thus |w˜i − wi| ≤ 4α4wi.
Lemma 33. Suppose that si ≥ s∗i + α4κ wi. Consider the next k updates to pi. Let pi1 be pi’s current
value, and pi2 , . . . , pik+1 be its k successive values. Let xij be the average value of xi while p = pij .
Suppose that pik+1 ≥ e−λfpi1 for some f ≥ 0. If k ≥
(
1 + 2α4
)
f + 2α4 c, then the warehouse stock
will have decreased to less than s∗i +
α4
κ wi at some point, or by at least cwi, whichever is the lesser
decrease.
Proof. Suppose that si ≥ s∗i + α4κ wi at the time of each of the k price updates (or the result holds
trivially).
Then a multiplicative price decrease by (1 − λ) is preceded by an additive increase to the
warehouse stock of at most wi. A smaller price decrease, by 1 + λ(min{1, xij − w˜ij )/wi}, for
w˜ij − xij < wi, follows a warehouse increase of exactly wi − xij ≤ w˜ij − xij − α4wi.
Note that 1 + x ≤ ex for |x| ≤ 1.
Suppose that there are f + a price decreases by 1− λ. Then there are at least a price increases
(as the total price decreases is by at most e−λf ). Suppose that there are a+ a′ price changes other
than the price decreases by 1 − λ. Now, ∑w˜ij−xij<wi λmin{1, (xij − w˜ij )/wi} − (f + a)λ ≥ −λf ,
as this is the exponent in an upper bound on the price decrease. Hence
∑
w˜ij−xij<wi
w˜ij − xij ≤∑
w˜ij−xij<wi
max{−wi, (w˜ij −xij )} ≤ [f − (f + a)]wi. It follows that the warehouse stock increases
are bounded by (f + a)wi +
∑
w˜ij−xij<wi
(w˜ij − xij − α4wi) ≤ [f − α4(a+ a′)]wi. As f + 2a+ a′ =
k ≥
(
1 + 2α4
)
f+ 2α4 c, a+a
′ ≥ 1α4 (f +c), and so the decrease in warehouse stock is at least cwi.
Lemma 34. Suppose that λ
(
1 + 1α4
)
≤ 12 and si ≤ s∗i + α4κ wi. Let pi1 , . . . , pik+1 , xi1 , . . . , xik be as
in Lemma 33. Suppose that pik+1 ≤ eλfpi1 for some f ≥ 0. Further suppose that the excess demand
between successive price increases is at most wi. If
k ≥ (1 + λ)
(
1 +
4
α4
)
f +
8
α4
λ+
4
α4
c,
then the warehouse stock will have increased to more than s∗i − α4κ wi at some point, or by at least
cwi, whichever is the lesser increase.
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Proof. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 33, suppose that si ≤ s∗i − α4κ wi throughout this time.
Then a multiplicative price increase by (1+λ) is preceded by an additive decrease of at most wi
in the warehouse stock. A smaller price increase, by 1+λ(max{−1, xij−w˜ij)/wi} for xij−w˜ij < wi,
follows a warehouse increase of wi − xij ≥ w˜ij − xij + α4wi.
Note that 1 + λx ≥ eλx/(1+λ) ≥ eλx−2λ2 for 0 ≤ λ, x ≤ 1, and 1 + λx ≥ eλx/(1−λ) ≥ eλx−2λ2 , for
−1 ≤ x ≤ 1 and 0 < λ ≤ 12 .
Suppose that there are (1+ λ)(f + a) price increases by 1 + λ. Then there are at least a(1− λ)
price decreases (for each such change is a drop of at most 1−λ ≥ e−λ/(1−λ), and the price increases
yielded an increase of least e(a+f)(1+λ)λ/(1+λ) = eλ(a+f)).
Now, ∑
xij−w˜ij<wi
[
λ(xij − w˜ij )/wi − 2λ2
]
+ (1 + λ)(f + a)
λ
1 + λ
≤ λf,
as this is the exponent in a lower bound on the price increase. That is∑
xij−w˜ij<wi
(w˜ij − xij + 2λ) ≥ awi
Suppose that there are a(1− λ) + a′ price changes other than the increases by (1 + λ).
The decrease in the warehouse stock is at most:
(1 + λ)(f + a)wi −
∑
xij−w˜ij<wi
(w˜ij − xij + α4wi)
≤ (1 + λ)(f + a)wi − awi + 2λwi − α4(a′ + (1− λ)a)wi
≤ wi
[
(1 + λ)f + 2λ− α4
[
a′ +
(
1−
(
1 +
1
α4
)
λ
)
a
]]
Now f(1 + λ) + 2a+ a′ = k, so
(
1−
(
1 + 1α4
)
λ
)
a+ a′ ≥
(
1−
(
1+ 1
α4
)
λ
)
2 [k − f(1 + λ)].
If α4
[
a′ +
(
1−
(
1 + 1α4
)
λ
)
a
]
≥ 2λ+ (1 + λ)f + c, the warehouse stock increases by at least
cwi. It suffices to have
k ≥ (1 + λ)f + 2α4(
1−
(
1 + 1α4
)
λ
) [2λ+ (1 + λ)f + c] .
By assumption
(
1 + 1α4
)
λ ≤ 12 , so k ≥ (1 + λ)
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8α4λ+
4
α4
c suffices.
In order to apply Lemma 34, we need to bound the length of the initial time interval after which
all demands satisfy xi ≤ 2wi. We will need several preliminary lemmas. In the next section, we
will avoid this difficulty by modifying the price update rule for the case that demands are large.
Lemma 2. If λE1−λE ≤ 16 , and if initially the prices have all been c-demand bounded for a full day
for some c ≥ 2, they remain c-demand bounded thereafter.
Proof. First we analyze the bounds for low prices.
For any good i, if pi ≤ p(c)i (1+λ)2, then by WGS and bounded elasticity, xi ≥ c(1+λ)−2Ewi ≥
c(1 − 2λE)wi, as 2λE ≤ 1, and hence xi ≥ c(1 − 2λE)wi also, which means that the next update
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to pi will be not be a decrease so long as (1− 2λE)wi ≥ w˜i. Applying Lemma 15 to give w˜i ≤ 43wi,
shows λE ≤ 16 suffices.
Otherwise, a price decrease decreases pi to at most p
(c)
i (1+λ)
2(1−λ) ≥ p(c)i ; that is, pi remains
above the lower bound.
Similarly, if pi ≥ p(1/c)i (1− λ)2, then xi ≤ 1c (1− λ)−2Ewi ≤ 1c (1 + 2 λE1−λE )wi, as 2 λE1−λE ≤ 1, and
hence xi ≥ 1c (1− 2 λE1−λE )wi also, which means that the next update to pi will be not be an increase
so long as 1c (1 + 2
λE
1−λE )wi ≤ w˜i. Here λE1−λE ≤ 16 suffices.
Otherwise, a price increase increases pi to at most p
(1/c)
i (1 − λ)2(1 + λ) ≤ p(1/c)i ; that is, pi
remains below the upper bound.
Lemma 35.
∑
iwipi ≤ 3(φ +M), where M is the daily supply of money.
Proof. We note that if xi ≤ 13wi, then by Lemma 15 xi ≤ 12 w˜i, and w˜i − xi ≥ 12w˜i. Now∑
i
wipi =
∑
xi≤wi/3
wipi +
∑
xi≥wi/3
wipi
≤
∑
i
|w˜i − xi|pi +
∑
i
3xipi ≤ φ+M.
Lemma 36. Let i = argmax{p∗ipi }. If pi < p∗i , then the total misspending,
∑
h |xh − wh|ph, is at
least wi(p
∗
i − pi). Similarly, let j = argmax{ pjp∗j }. If pj > p
∗
j , then the total misspending is at least
wi(pj − p∗j).
Proof. By WGS, when the price of a good is reduced, the spending on that good only increases.
Consider reducing the prices from their equilibrium values, one by one, for each of the goods whose
price is below its equilibrium value. Each price reduction can be viewed as occuring in two stages,
first a spending neutral change, which leaves the spending on every good unchanged, and second
a stage which increases the spending on the good whose price is being reduced. Clearly, there
is no reduction of spending in total, on the goods whose prices are reduced. Thus the excess
spending is at least that which would be obtained were all the prices spending neutral. Consider
good i in this spending neutral scenario. At price pi, the excess spending on good i would be
pi(xi − wi) = p∗iwi − piwi, as claimed.
The proof of the second claim is analogous.
Lemma 37. Let φinit be the initial value for φ. If α2 > 1 and |w˜i − wi| ≤ α3wi = 4α4wi for all i,
where
α3 ≤ (1− λα1)(1 − 6(1 + 2α2))
12γ(1 + 2α2)
and γ = maxi
M
p∗iwi
, then after
D =
16(1 + α2)
λα1
log
2φinit
(1− λα1)mini p∗iwi
days all demands satisfy xi ≤ 2wi henceforth.
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Proof. We want to show that φ ≥ 2(1 + 2α2)
∑
i |w˜i − wi|pi, while some pi /∈ [12p∗i , 32p∗i ], for then
we can apply Corollary 3 to obtain that dφdt ≤ − λα18(1+α2)φ (as χi = 0 for all i in the present
setting). The condition on φ holds if φ ≥ 2(1 + 2α2)α3
∑
iwipi, and by Lemma 35, this holds if
φ ≥ 6(1 + 2α2)α3(φ+M); in turn, it suffices that
φ ≥ 6(1 + 2α2)α3M
1− 6(1 + 2α2)α3 .
Now
φ ≥
∑
i
[(1− λα1)|xi − w˜i|+ α2|w˜i − wi|]pi
≥
∑
i
[(1− λα1)(|xi − wi| − |w˜i − wi|) + α2|w˜i −wi|]pi
≥ (1− λα1)
∑
i
(|xi − wi|pi as α2 > 1.
Suppose there is a good h such that ph /∈ [12p∗h, 32p∗h]; then let h = argmax{ pip∗i ,
p∗i
pi
}. By Lemma
36,
∑
i |xi − wi|pi ≥ wh|ph − p∗h| > 12whp∗h ≥ 12γM . Thus φ ≥ 12whp∗h ≥ 12γM .
So the condition holds if
1− λα1
2γ
M ≥ 6(1 + 2α2)
1− 6(1 + 2α2)α3α3M.
It suffices that
α3 ≤ (1− λα1)(1 − 6(1 + 2α2))
12γ(1 + 2α2)
to ensure that dφdt ≤ − λα18(1+α2)φ. Thus after at most
D =
16(1 + α2)
λα1
log
φinit
1−λα1
2 mini wip
∗
i
days, φ ≤ 12(1− λα1)p∗iwi for all i.
Suppose, for a contradiction, that after D days some xh > 2wh. Then ph(xh − wh) > 12p∗hwh.
Now φ ≥ (1− λα1)
∑
i |xi − wi|pi ≥ (1− λα1)(xh − wh)ph > 12(1− λα1)whp∗h ≥ φ.
We now obtain a bound on the depletion of the warehouse stock while the prices are decreasing
from their initial values to a value that guarantees 2-demand bound henceforth, which allows
Lemmas 33 and 34 to be applied.
Lemma 38. During the time that φ reduces to at most 12 (1− λα1)whp∗h ≥ φ, for each i, the stock
of warehouse i reduces by at most
(d− 1)Dwi = (d− 1)wi 16(1 + α2)
λα1
log
φinit
1−λα1
2 mini wip
∗
i
.
Proof. Each day, the stock can reduce by at most (d − 1)wi. By Lemma 37, the stated reduction
in potential occurs within D days.
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Now we are ready to bound how large a warehouse suffices, given an upper bound on φinit.
Recall that we view the warehouse as having 8 equal sized zones of fullness.
Note that if the ith warehouse were completely full or empty, then |w˜i − wi| = 12κci, and as
we assumed that |w˜i − wi| ≤ α3wi, this implies that 12κci ≤ α3wi. Note that Constraint 1 implies
1
2κci ≤ 13wi, which is ensured if α3 ≤ 13 .
Theorem 6. Suppose that the prices are always f -bounded and let d = d(f). Also suppose that
each price is updated at least once a day. Suppose further that the warehouses are initially all
in their safe or inner buffer zones. Finally, suppose that λ
(
1 + 1α4
)
≤ 12 . Then the warehouse
stocks never go outside their outer buffers (i.e. they never overflow or run out of stock) if α4κ =
ci
8wi
≥ max
{
(d− 1)D, 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f
λ +
8λ
α4
}
; furthermore, after D + 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f
λ +
8λ
α4
+ 8κ days the
warehouses will be in their safe or inner buffer zones thereafter, where
D =
16(1 + α2)
λα1
log
φinit
1−λα1
2 miniwip
∗
i
,
and φinit is the initial value of φ.
If the fast updates rule is followed, then it suffices to have α4κ =
ci
8wi
≥ 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8λα4 , and
then after
(
1 + 4α4
)
f + 8λα4λ +
8
κ days the warehouses will be in their safe or inner buffer zones
thereafter.
Again, substituting our bounds on λ, α1, α4 suggests D is rather large. The result should be
viewed as indicating that there is a bound on the needed warehouse size, but not that this is a
tight bound (in terms of constants).
Proof. We will consider warehouse i. After an initial D days (as defined in Lemma 37), the demands
are henceforth 2-bounded. In this time, by Lemma 38, the warehouse stocks can decrease by at
most (d − 1)Dwi ≤ 18ci. As a result the warehouses are all in their middle buffers or nearer the
center at this point.
We show that henceforth the tendency is to improve, i.e. move toward the safe zone, but there
can be fluctuations of up to one zone width. The result is that every warehouse remains within its
outer buffer, and after a suitable time they will all be in either their inner buffer or safe zone.
As it is f -bounded, price pi can decrease by at most e
−2(f/λ)λ from its initial value. If si(t) is
in middle buffer at time t, then by Lemma 33 (taking c = 0), within 2
(
1 + 2α4
)
f
λ days the value of
si will have returned to si(t) or remained below this value. During this interval a decrease of ω in
the warehouse stock takes at least ω days to replenish; consequently the stock can increase by at
most 2
(
1 + 2α4
)
f
λwi. It follows that the warehouse never runs out of stock as each portion of the
outer buffer has width at least 18ci ≥ 2
(
1 + 2α4
)
f
λwi. Again, by Lemma 33, taking c =
ci
4wi
, after
2
(
1 + 2α4
)
f
λ +
ci
2α4wi
days it will have reached the safe zone. The preceding argument shows that
it can never go above the inner buffer henceforth.
We apply the same argument to the low zones using Lemma 34. Now, with c = 0, we see that
within 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f
λ+
8λ
α4
λ days si returns to the inner buffer. Likewise after 2
(
1 + 4α4
)
f
λ+
8λ
α4
+ ciα4wi
days it will never again go below the inner buffer.
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If the fast update rule is followed then the first phase in which the potential reduces is not
needed, and then the warehouse will never go beyond its middle buffer (so in fact the outer buffers
are then not needed). The analysis of the second phase is as before, except that the time needed
to first reach the inner buffer has a bound that is half as large.
Comment. We note that the constraints on λ, α4, ci and κ can be met in turn. Lemma 37
constrains α3 = 4α4 (while λ appears in this constraint we already know from Lemma 4 that we
want λα1 ≤ 12 , which bound can safely be used). In turn, the bound λ
(
1 + 1α3
)
≤ 12 and Theorem
4 constrain λ. Finally, ci is upper bounded (and hence κ lower bounded) by the conditions in
Theorems 4 and 6.
3.8 The Effect of Inaccuracy
We begin by analyzing Case (i), where the parameter ρ is not known to the price-setters.
Lemma 39. When pi is updated, if Assumption 2 and Constraint 1 hold,
α2
2 +α1max{32 , d−1} ≤ 1,
and λα1+
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, then φi increases by at most 43λρ(2b+κ)
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
wipi.
Proof. We use Lemma 18. Were ∆ipi accurate, Corollary 4 assures us that φ only decreases.
With a toward w˜i update |∆ipi| is too small by at most λρ(2b + κ)pi. Thus the increase in φ is
at most w˜iλρ(2b + κ)pi; using the bound w˜i ≤ 43wi from Lemma 15, yields that this is at most
4
3λρ(2b+ κ)wipi.
With an away from w˜i update |∆ipi| may be too large by at most λρ(2b+κ)pi. Thus the increase
in φ is at most w˜iλρpi
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
(2b + κ), which is at most 43λρ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
(2b +
κ)wipi.
The result of Lemma 16 holds unchanged, namely that dφ/dt ≤ −κ(α2−1)2 φ except when a price
increase occurs. We will deduce that so long as φ is large enough it will decrease by a 1− κ(α2−1)8 )
rate daily.
The following preliminary lemma is helpful.
Lemma 40.
∑
iwipi ≤ φ/(1 − λα1) +M , where M is the daily supply of money.
Proof. Note that M =
∑
i xipi and that φi ≥ |w˜i−xi|(1−λα1)+α2|w˜i−wi| ≥ |w˜i−xi|(1−λα1)+
|w˜i − wi|. Now∑
i
wipi ≤
∑
i
pi(xi + |w˜i − xi|+ |wi − w˜i|)
≤
∑
i
xipi + 2
∑
i
pi[|w˜i − xi|(1− λα1) + |w˜i − wi|]/(1 − λα1)
≤ M + φ/(1 − λα1).
Before obtaining a bound on the rate of decrease of φ, we state a more general result which will
be used for a series of results of this nature.
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Lemma 41. Let D = [τ, τ +1] be a day. Let φ+ = maxt∈Dφ(t). Suppose that except when a price
increase occurs, dφdt ≤ −νφ + γ, for parameters 0 < ν ≤ 1, γ ≥ 0. Further suppose that the price
updates over the course of day D collectively increment φ by at most µ(a1φ
+ + a2φ(τ) + a3M),
where M is the daily supply of money, and µ, a1, a2, a3 ≥ 0 are suitable parameters.
If µ
[
a1(1+µa2)
1−µa1
+ a2
]
≤ ν8 and φ(τ) ≥ 8µν a3M 11−µa1 , then φ(τ + 1) ≤
(
1− ν4
)
φ(τ) + γ1−µa1 .
Proof. φ(τ + 1) ≤ e−νφ(τ) + γ + µ(a1φ+ + a2φ(τ) + a3M) as dφdt ≤ −νφ + γ. So φ(τ + 1) ≤
(1− ν/2)φ(τ) + γ + µ(a1φ+ + a2φ(τ) + a3M), if ν ≤ 1 (using the power series expansion for e−x).
Now φ+ ≤ φ(τ) + µ(a1φ+ + a2φ(τ) + a3M + γ); hence
φ+ ≤
[
φ(τ)(1 + µa2) + µa3M + γ
1− µa1
]
.
Thus
φ(τ + 1) ≤ φ(τ)(1 − ν/2) + µφ(τ)
[
a1(1 + µa2)
1− µa1 + a2
]
+ µa3M
[
µa1
1− µa1 + 1
]
+
γ
1− µa1
≤ φ(τ)(1 − ν/4) + γ
1− µa1
if µφ(τ)
[
a1(1 + µa2)
1− µa1 + a2
]
≤ ν
8
φ(τ) i.e. µ
[
a1(1 + µa2)
1− µa1 + a2
]
≤ ν
8
and µa3M
[
µa1
1− µa1 + 1
]
≤ νφ(τ)
8
i.e. φ(τ) ≥ 8µ
ν
a3M
1
1− µa1 .
Theorem 7. If Assumption 2 and Constraint 1 hold, α22 + α1max{32 , (d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
4
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, κ(α2−1)2 ≤ 1, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 , and each price is updated at least
once every day, and at most every 1/b days, and if φ ≥ 16µMκ(α2−1)
1−λα1
1−λα1−µ
at the start of the day,
then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)8 factor by the end of the day, where M is the daily supply
of money and µ = 43λρb(2b+κ)
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
, supposing that κ(α2− 1) ≥ 16µ/[1−λα1−µ].
Proof. We will apply Lemma 41. By Lemma 16, dφ/dt ≤ −κ(α2−1)φ2 , except when there is a price
increase, so ν = κ(α2−1)2 and γ = 0.
We now determine the other parameters. Consider a time interval of length 1/b days. There is at
most one price increase per good during this interval. By Lemma 39, they increase the potential by
at most
∑
i
4
3λρ(2b+κ)
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
wipi =
4
3λρ(2b+κ)
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
) [
φ+
(1−λα1)
+M
]
(on
using Lemma 40 to bound
∑
i wipi). Thus µ =
4
3λρb(2b+ κ)
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
, a1 = 1/(1− λα1),
a2 = 0, and a3 = 1.
To analyze Case (ii) we will use the potential
φi = pi[span(xi, xi, w˜i)− 4κ(1 + α2)(t− τi)|xi − w˜i|+ α2|w˜i − wi|].
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By Lemma 16, dφidt ≤ −κ(α2−1)2 φi at any time when no price update is occurring (this follows by
setting λ = 4κ(1 + α2) in the statement of Lemma 16).
We say that an attempted update of pi is a null update if pi is unchanged due to z
r
i being too
small.
Lemma 42. When pi undergoes a null update, φi increases by at most 8κ(1+α2)ρ(2b+κ)wipi(t−τi),
where t is the current time and τi the time of the last update or attempted update.
Proof. The cost for a null update is 4κ(1+α2)(t−τi)|xi− w˜i|pi. As this is a null update, |xi− w˜i| ≤
2(2b+ κ)ρwi, so we see that the cost is at most 8κ(1 + α2)(2b+ κ)ρwipi(t− τi).
Lemma 43. When pi undergoes an actual update, if Assumption 2 and Constraint 1 hold,
α2
2 +
α1max{3, 2(d− 1)} ≤ 1, κ(1+α2)2 ≤ 1, and λα1+2λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, then φi only decreases.
Proof. We use Lemma 18.
Since |zci − zri | ≥ 12zri , we know that 12zri ≤ zci ≤ 32zri . Consequently, the magnitude of the
calculated ∆ipi, ranges between
1
2 and
3
2 times the ideal value, the value that would be obtained
were zri = z
c
i .
In the bounds of Lemma 18, we need to replace the ideal value of ∆ipi by the worst case for
the calculated value. This yields the following constraints to ensure φi only decreases.
Case 1. A toward w˜i update:
Case 1.1. |xi − w˜i| ≤ wi.
Here |∆ipi| ≥ 12λ|xi − w˜i|pi/wi. So φ only decreases if
λα1|xi − w˜i|pi ≤ 1
2
(1− 1
2
α2)w˜iλ|xi − w˜i|pi/wi. (21)
By Lemma 15, w˜i/wi ≥ 23 , so 32α1 + 14α2 ≤ 12 suffices.
Case 1.2. |xi − w˜i| > wi.
Here |∆ipi| ≥ 12λpi. So φ only decreases if
λα1(d− 1)w˜ipi ≤ 1
2
(1− 1
2
α2)w˜i
1
2
λpi. (22)
The condition α1(d− 1) + 14α2 ≤ 12 suffices.
Case 2. An away from w˜i update:
Here |∆ipi| ≤ 32λpi|xi − w˜i|/wi. So φ only decreases if[
w˜i +
2E
1− λExi +
1
2
α2w˜i
]
3
2
λpi|xi − w˜i|/wi ≤ (1− λα1)pi|xi − w˜i|. (23)
By Lemma 15, w˜i ≤ 43wi, so this is subsumed by λα1 + 2λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1.
Theorem 8. If Assumption 2 and Constraint 1 hold, α22 + α1max{3, 2(d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
2λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, 4κ(1+α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 for all i, κ(α2−1)2 ≤ 1, µ
[
1+µ/(1−λα1)
1−µ/(1−λα1)
+ 1(1−λα1)
]
≤
κ(α2−1)
2 , if φ ≥ 32µM[1− µ
1−λα1
][(κ(α2−1)]
at the start of the day, where µ = 8κ(1+α2)(2b+κ)ρ, and if each
price is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)8 factor daily.
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Proof. Again, we apply Lemma 41.
By Lemma 16, dφ/dt ≤ −κ(α2−1)2 , except when there is a price increase, so ν = κ(α2−1)2 and
γ = 0.
We now determine the other parameters.
To total the increase due to null updates, we spread the potential increase due to each null
update uniformly across the time interval between the present null update and the predeceding
update to the same price (null or otherwise). By Lemma 42, the potential increase due to a null
update to pi at time t is at most 8κ(1 + α2)(2b+ κ)ρwipi(t)∆ = µwipi(t)∆, where ∆ is the length
of the time interval over which the increase is being spread. Thus the total potential increase due
to null updates during D is bounded by µ
∫
D
∑
i wipidt plus the following term which covers the
intervals that extend into the day preceding D: µ
∑
iwipi(τ).
Then, using Lemma 40 to bound
∑
i piwi, shows that the potential increase over D is bounded
by µ[M + φ+/(1 − λα1)] + µ[M + φ(τ)/(1 − λα1)]. So we can set a1 = a2 = /1/(1 − λα1) and
a3 = 2.
Remark. To combine the fast update rule with the rule of at most one update every 1/b days, we
restate them as follows: an update to pi occurs after a wi reduction to the corresponding warehouse
stock, and if that does not occur, following a period of between 1/b and 1 day since the last update
to pi, null or otherwise.
Small changes will be needed in the proof of Theorem 7.
3.9 Discrete Goods and Prices
The analysis of the discrete case is similar to that for inaccurate data. We begin by examining the
sources of “error” in the discrete setting.
Sources of Error.
As |xIi −yi| ≤ 1, and |w˜Ai −w˜Ii | ≤ κ the previous bound of 2(b+κ)ρwi on the error in calculating
zi (= yi − w˜i here) is replaced by 1 + κ. This amounts to setting ρ = mini(1 + κ)/[2(b + κ)wi].
Note that this implies that a price update occurs only if |xAi − w˜i| ≥ 2(1 + κ). 8
We also need to take account of the fact that the prices pi are integral, but the calculated
updates need not be. To avoid overlarge updates, we conservatively round down the the magnitude
of each update. Note that this reduces the value of the update by at most a factor of 2. This
introduces a second source of error, which we need to incorporate in the analysis. In addition, this
has the following implication: no price can be less than 1/λ, for a smaller price would never be
updated; furthermore, the price 1/λ may not be reduced even if the update rule so indicated.
Lemma 44. If Constraint 2 holds, then 34w˜
I
i ≤ wi ≤ 32 w˜Ii and |w˜Ii − wi| ≤ 12w˜Ii . In addition,
Constraint 2 holds for all possible warehouse contents if κmax{|ci − s∗i |, s∗i } ≤ 13wi, and if in
addition s∗i = ci/2, the condition becomes κ ≤ 23 wici .
The analysis will follow scenario (ii) from Section 3.8, since “ρ” is known. First, we note that
Lemma 3.8 still holds, as M ≥∑i xipi.
8We could enforce a condition |xAi − yi| ≤
1
(1+κ)
(or any other convenient positive bound), and then price updates
would occur so long as |xAi − w˜i| ≥ 1; however, the bound on the elasticity for the yi demands would increase
correspondingly.
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We use a potential φi expressed in terms of yi:
φi = pi
[
span(yi, yi, w˜
I
i )− 4κ(1 + α2)(t− τi)|yi − w˜Ii |+ α2|w˜Ii − wi|
]
.
We restate Lemma 18 in terms of the demands yi in the corresponding divisible market.
Lemma 45. If Constraint 2 holds and yi ≤ dw˜Ii for all i, then when pi is updated, φ increases by
at most the following:
(i) With a toward w˜i update:
λα1|yi − w˜Ii |pi +
1
2
α2w˜
I
i |∆ipi| − w˜Ii |∆ipi|. (24)
(ii) With an away from w˜i update:(
1 +
2Ed
1− λE
)
w˜Ii |∆ipi|+
1
2
α2w˜
I
i |∆ipi| − (1− λα1)pi|yi − w˜Ii |. (25)
Proof. The only changes were to replace xi by yi and w˜i by w˜
I
i which reflect the corresponding
changes to the potential function.
Again, we say that an update is null if it leaves the price unchanged. Its cost is bounded in the
following lemma.
Lemma 46. When pi undergoes a null update, φi increases by at most 6(1+κ)κ(1+α2)(t−τi)wi/λ
if |xAi − w˜Ai | ≥ 2(1 + κ) and by at most 12(1 + κ)κ(1 + α2)(t− τi)pi if |xAi − w˜Ai | < 2(1 + κ), where
t is the current time and τi the time of the last update or attempted update.
Proof. The cost for a null update is 4κ(1 + α2)(t − τi)|yi − w˜Ii |pi. As this is a null update, either
λ|xAi − w˜Ai |pi/wi < 1 or |xAi − w˜Ai | < 2(1 + κ). Now |yi − w˜Ii | ≤ |xIi − w˜Ii | + 1 = |xAi − w˜Ai | + 1.
If |xAi − w˜Ai | ≥ 2(1 + κ), |yi − w˜Ii | ≤ 32 (1 + κ)|xAi − w˜Ai |. So we see that the cost is at most either
6(1+κ)κ(1+α2)(wi/λ)(t−τi) if |xAi −w˜Ai | ≥ 2(1+κ) and 12(1+κ)κ(1+α2)(t−τi)pi otherwise.
Next, we bound
∑
iwi and
∑
i pi.
Lemma 47. If wi ≥ 6 for all i,
∑
iwi =M/r, and
∑
i pi ≤ 3s
(
φ
(1−λα1)
+M
)
.
Proof. The first claim simply restates the definition of r. For the second claim, we argue as follows.
∑
i
pi =
∑
yIi≤wi/3
pi +
∑
yIi>wi/3
pi ≤
∑
yIi≤wi/3
|w˜Ii − yIi |pi
wi/3
+
3
s
∑
yIi>wi/3
yIi pi
The first term in the inequality following from Lemma 15, as w˜Ii ≥ 23wi. The above total is bounded
by 3s
(
φi
(1−λα1)
+M
)
.
Lemma 48. When pi undergoes an actual update, if Constraint 2 holds and yi ≤ dw˜Ii for all i,
α2
2 + α1max{92 , 2(d − 1))} ≤ 1, λα1 + 83λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, and each wi ≥ 2, then φi only
decreases.
49
Proof. In the same way that the proof of Lemma 39 is based on Lemma 18, we use Lemma 45.
Since the potential function is based on yi and yi values, we need to bound ∆ipi in terms of yi.
In fact, it is calculated in terms of xi.
We note that |xAi − w˜Ai | − 1− κ ≤ |yi − w˜Ii | ≤ |xAi − w˜Ai |+ 1 + κ.
Case 1. A toward w˜Ii update.
Case 1.1. |xAi − w˜Ai | ≤ wi.
Here |∆ipi| ≥ 12λ|xAi − w˜Ai |pi/wi, as by assumption λ|xAi − w˜Ai |pi/wi ≥ 2 for an actual update.
So φ is non-increasing as a result of the update if
λα1|yi − w˜Ii |pi ≤ (1−
1
2
α2)w˜
I
i ·
1
2
λ|xAi − w˜Ai |
pi
wi
. (26)
By Lemma 15, w˜Ii /wi ≥ 23 , and as already noted |yi − w˜Ii | ≤ |xAi − w˜Ai | + 1 + κ, so λα1(|xAi −
w˜Ai |+ 1+ κ)pi ≤ (1− 12α2) · 13λ|xAi − w˜Ai |pi suffices. As |xAi − w˜Ai | ≥ 2(1 + κ) for an actual update,
|xAi − w˜Ai |+ 1 + κ ≤ 32 |xAi − w˜Ai |, and 92α1 + 12α2 ≤ 1 suffices.
Case 1.2. |xAi − w˜Ai | > wi.
Here |∆ipi| ≥ 12λpi. So φ is non-increasing due to the update if λα1(d−1)w˜Ii pi ≤ (1− 12α2)w˜Ii · 12λpi.
In turn, 2α1(d− 1) + 12α2 ≤ 1 suffices.
Case 2. An away from w˜Ii update.
Here |∆ipi| ≤ λpi|xAi − w˜Ai |/wi. Recall that an update occurs only if |xAi − w˜Ai | ≥ 2(1 + κ), and
hence |yi − w˜Ii | ≥ 12(xAi − w˜Ai ). Thus |∆ipi| ≤ 2λpi|yi − w˜Ii |/wi. So φ is non-increasing due to the
update if
2λpi|yi − w˜Ii |
(
1 +
2Ed
1− λE +
1
2
α2
)
w˜Ii
wi
≤ (1− λα1)pi|yi − w˜Ii |. (27)
As w˜Ii /wi ≤ 43 by Lemma 44, this is subsumed by λα1 + 83λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1.
Next, we apply Lemma 16 to get a bound on dφ/dt.
Corollary 6. If 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 , dφidt ≤ −κ(α2−1)2 φi + κpi at any time when no price update
is occurring (to any pj); this bound also holds for the one-sided derivatives when a price update
occurs.
Proof. This is Lemma 16, with xi replaced by yi and w˜i by w˜
I
i . So χi =
dw˜Ii
dt + κ(yi − wi) =
−κ(xIi −wi) + κ(yi − wi) = −κ(xi − yi), and hence 0 ≤ −piχi ≤ −κpi.
Theorem 9. If Constraint 2 holds and yi ≤ dw˜i for all i, α22 + α1max{92 , 2(d − 1)} ≤ 1, λα1 +
8
3λ
(
1 + 2Ed1−λE +
1
2α2
)
≤ 1, each wi ≥ 6, 4κ(1 + α2) ≤ λα1 ≤ 12 for all i,
s ≥ 48(α2−1)(1−λα1)
[
1 + 6(1 + α2) + (1 + α2)
1−λα1+
18
s
κ(1+α2)+
3κ
s
1−λα1−
18
s
κ(1+α2)
]
,
if φ(τ) ≥ 48(α2−1)
[
(1 + α2)
(
4
λr +
24
s
)
+ 1s
]
1−λα1
1−λα1−
18
s
κ(1+α2)
M at the start of the day, and if each price
is updated at least once every day, then φ decreases by at least a 1− κ(α2−1)8 factor over the course
of the day.
Proof. We prove the result for a day D starting at time τ , using Lemma 41, as in the proof of
Lemma 4.
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First, we note that by applying Lemma 16, we can set ν = κ(α2 − 1)/2 and γ =
∑
i pi.
To total the increase due to null updates during D, we spread the potential increase due to each
null update uniformly across the time interval between the present null update and the preceding
update to the same price (null or otherwise). By Lemma 46, the potential increase due to a null
update to pi at time t is at most 6κ(1+α2)
wi
λ if |xi− w˜i| ≥ 2, and 12κ(1+α2)pi∆ otherwise, where
∆ is the length of the time interval over which the increase is being spread. Thus the total potential
increase due to null updates during D is bounded by 6κ(1 + α2)
∫
D[
∑
i
wi
λ +
∑
|xi−w˜i|<2
2pi(t)]dt
plus the following term which covers the intervals that extend into the day preceding D: 6κ(1 +
α2)
∑
i
wi
λ +
∑
|xi−w˜i|<2
2pi(τ).
The potential increase during D due to the “γ” term is at most κ
∑
i pi.
As shown in Lemma 47,
∑
i wi ≤M/r and
∑
i pi ≤ 3φ/[s(1−λα1)] + 3M/s. It follows that the
potential increase over D is bounded by 6κ(1+α2){M/(λr)+6M/s+3φ+/[s(1−λα1)]+M/(λr)+
6M/s+3φ(τ)/[s(1−λα1)]}+κ[3φ/[s(1−λα1)]+3M/s]. So we can apply Lemma 41 with µ = 3κ,
a1 = 6(1+α2)/[s(1−λα1)], a2 = [6(1+α2)+1]/[s(1−λα1)] and a3 = (1+α2)[4/(λr)+24/s]+1/s.
The condition φ(τ) ≥ 8µν a3M 11−µa1 in Lemma 47 becomes
φ(τ) ≥ 48
(α2 − 1)
[
(1 + α2)
(
4
λr
+
24
s
)
+
1
s
]
1− λα1
1− λα1 − 18s κ(1 + α2)
M.
Similarly, the condition µ
[
a1(1+µa2)
1−µa1)
+ a2
]
≤ ν8 becomes
3(1 + α2)
s(1− λα1)
[
1− λα1 + 18s κ(1 + α2) + 3κs
1− λα1 − 18s κ(1 + α2)
]
+
18(1 + α2)
s(1− λα1) +
3
s(1− λα1) ≤
α2 − 1
16
;
equivalently,
s ≥ 48
(α2 − 1)(1 − λα1)
[
1 + 6(1 + α2) + (1 + α2)
1− λα1 + 18s κ(1 + α2) + 3κs
1− λα1 − 18s κ(1 + α2)
]
.
Theorem 10. In the discrete setting there are markets with Ω(E/r) misspending at any pricing.
Proof. The construction uses one good plus money. Let pg by the price of the good, xg the demand
for the good and n$ the demand for money. We define a continuous CES utility [xg(r+1/2)]
1−1/E+
n
1−1/E
$ for the aggregate demand (it can be due to one buyer), with a supply that at pg = r+ 1/2
spends M/2 money on M2r+1 units of good g. It is not hard to check that at pg = r and r+ 1 there
is already a change of θ(Eng/r) in the demand for good g.
3.9.1 Construction of Virtual Demands y
Our goal is to construct virtual demands yi, with xi−1 < yi ≤ xi, defined for all p for which xi ≥ 1.
Further the spending on yi will be a non-increasing function of pi, will obey WGS at integer price
points (which is where it is defined), and will have elasticity parameter 2E.
yi is constructed as follows.
For each collection of prices p−i, let mi(j) be the spending on good i when pi = j; we also write
it as mj for short. Consider the sequence m1,m2,m3, · · · and let ml1 = m1,ml2 ,ml3 , · · · be the
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maximal subsequence of non-increasing nonzero spending. We create a new sequence m′1,m
′
2, · · ·
of virtual spending, such that m′j ≥ m′j+1 for all j. First, we set m′la = mla for all a. If mla =
mla+1 , then we set m
′
j = mla for all j ∈ (la, la+1). Also, if xi(la+1 − 1) ≥ xi(la+1) + 2, then
we set m′j = mla for all j ∈ (la, la+1). Likewise, if xi(j) < xi(j − 1) for some j ∈ (la, la+1), we
set m′la+1,m
′
la+2
, · · · ,m′j = mla . If mlb is the last term in the non-increasing sequence, we set
m′j = mlb for all j > lb with mj > 0. The only other alternative is that there is an h ≥ la
with m′la = m
′
h, and xi(h) = xi(h + 1) = · · · = xi(la+1 − 1) = xi(la+1) + 1. Then, for j ∈
(h, la+1), y
′
i(j) is defined to interpolate between yi(h) and yi(la+1) as follows: y
′(j) = yi(h)
(
h
j
)c
,
where c is given by yi(h)
(
h
la+1
)c
= yi(la+1). Then yi(p) = yi(p−i, j) is given by yi(p−i, j) =
maxq−i≤p−i{y′i(p−i, j), yi(q−i, j)}. Note that jy′(j) = hyi(h)
(
h
j
)c−1
, for h ≤ j ≤ la+1. As we know
that hyi(h) = m
′
la
> mla+1 = la+1yi(la+1), in this last case, on setting j = la+1, we can conclude
that c− 1 > 0, i.e. that c > 1.
Lemma 49. yi(j) > xi(j) − 1 for all j.
Proof. Case 1 m′j = mla for some la < j.
By Discrete WGS, mla ≥ mj − (la − 1). Thus
yi(j) =
m′j
j
=
mla
j
≥ mj
j
− la − 1
j
> xi(j)− 1.
Case 2 m′j < mj but mj 6= mla for any a.
Then there is a maximal sequence mh,mh+1, · · · ,mk, with j ∈ (h, k] and k = la+1− 1 for some
a, for which xi(h) = xi(h+ 1) = · · · = xi(k) = xi(k + 1) + 1. Case 1 shows that yi(h) > xi(h)− 1.
By construction, yi(k) > xi(k+1) = xi(k)− 1, and as the values y′h, y′h+1, · · · , y′k form a decreasing
sequence by construction, it follows that for j with h < j ≤ k, yi(j) ≥ yi(k) > xi(k) − 1 =
xi(j) − 1.
Lemma 50. mi(j) ≥ mi(j + 1) for all i and j.
Proof. The only case we need to check is when y′i(j+1) is defined by interpolation for j ∈ (h, la+1)
say. By construction, piy
′
i is a decreasing function of pi on the interpolating interval. Now the result
follows by induction on p−i. The claim holds for p−i = 1, as then y
′
i(p) = yi(p). For larger p−i, yi
as a function of pi is simply a max of noncreasing functions and hence is itself non-increasing.
Lemma 51. At discrete prices for which xi > 0, the demands yi obey WGS.
Proof. First, we note that as pi increases the virtual spending m
′
i on good i only decreases, and
hence yi only decreases.
Next, we consider the change to yi as pj increases, for j 6= i. Let pi = h. Consider prices pj and
pj+1 for good j. Suppose that yi(h, pj+1) is set by a rule making m
′
h(pj+1) = mla(pj+1), where
h ≥ la. By Discrete WGS, mla(pj + 1) ≥ mla(pj). By construction, mla(pj) ≥ m′la(pj) ≥ m′h(pj).
So m′h(pj + 1) ≥ m′h(pj) and hence yi(h, pj + 1) ≥ yi(h, pj) in this case.
Otherwise, by construction, yh(pj + 1) ≥ yh(pj).
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Lemma 52. The demands yi obey bounded elasticity:
yi(p−i, pi) ≤ yi(p−i, pi + d)
(
1 +
d
pi
)2E
if yi(p−i, pi + d) > 0.
Proof. Note that it suffices to prove the bound for d = 1, as(
1 +
a
pi
)(
1 +
b
a+ pi
)
=
pi + a+ b
pi
=
(
1 +
a+ b
pi
)
.
Case 1 m′pi = m
′
pi+1
.
Then yi(pi) =
m′pi
pi
, yi(pi + 1) =
m′pi+1
pi+1
. So, piyi(pi) = (pi + 1)yi(pi + 1), or yi(pi) ≤ yi(pi +
1)
(
1 + 1pi
)
.
Case 2 m′h(pl) = m
′
h(pl − 1).
We note that m′h+1(pl) ≥ m′h+1(pl − 1), so
m′
h
(pl)
m′
h+1(pl)
≤ m′h(pl−1)m′
h+1(pl−1)
, and y
′(h,pl)
y′(h+1,pl)
≤ y′(h,pl−1)y′(h+1,pl−1) .
Hence the claim follows by induction on p−i since Case 2 does not apply at the base cases when
p−i = 1.
Case 3 xi(h) ≥ x(la+1) + 2, where la ≤ h < la+1.
This is an intermediate bound, used in Case 4, except when h+ 1 = la+1.
By Discrete WGS, xi(h) ≤
⌈
xi(la+1)
(
1 + la+1−hh
)E⌉
. Hence xi(h)−1 < xi(la+1)
(
1 + la+1−hh
)E
,
or
xi(la+1) + [xi(h) − xi(la+1)− 1]
xi(la+1)
≤
(
1 +
la+1 − h
h
)E
.
As xi(h)−xi(la+1) ≥ 2, xi(h)−xi(la+1)−1 ≥ 1. Let ∆ denote xi(h)−xi(la+1)−1. So 1+ ∆xi(la+1) ≤(
1 + la+1−hh
)E
. Hence 1 + 2∆xi(la+1) ≤
(
1 + la+1−hh
)2E
, or
xi(h) + [xi(h) − xi(la+1)− 2]
xi(la+1)
≤
(
1 +
la+1 − h
h
)2E
.
Hence yi(h) ≤ xi(h) ≤ xi(la+1)
(
1 + la+1−hh
)2E
.
Case 4 yj is defined by interpolation.
Then there are an h and an la with j ∈ (h, la+1), such that xi(h − 1) > xi(h) = xi(h + 1) =
· · · = xi(k) > xi(k + 1), with k + 1 = la+1, where y′h+1, y′h+2, · · · , y′k are obtained by interpolation
between y′h and y
′
k+1 = xk+1.
By Case 3, yi(h) ≤ yi(la+1)
(
1 + la+1−hh
)2E
. Let c > 1 satisfy yi(h) = yi(la+1)
(
1 + la+1−hh
)c
; so
0 < c ≤ 2E (in fact, 1 < c ≤ 2E). By construction, for h ≤ j < la+1, yi(j) = yi(la+1)
(
1 + la+1−jj
)c
;
thus yi(j) = yi(j + 1)
(
1 + 1j
)c
≤ yi(j + 1)
(
1 + 1j
)2E
.
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3.10 Extensions
Property 1, while implicit, underpins our analysis, but so far we have limited ourselves to the case
α = 1. Essentially, reducing α will slow the daily reduction in potential by an α factor. Now we
consider two extensions of the ongoing Fisher market with WGS and bounded elasticity which will
have an α in the range (0, 1).
3.10.1 Beyond WGS
Instead of having demands for goods j 6= i only increase when pi increases by ∆ipi > 0, we could
allow some of the demands to decrease, but with the constraint that the total of all reductions be
bounded as follows: ∑
x′j<xj
|xj − x′j|pj ≤ (1− α)wi∆ipi, (28)
which we call the α-bounded complements property. A symmetric condition applies when ∆ipi < 0.
Lemma 53. If demands obey the α-bounded complements property then Property 1 holds.
Proof. The one change to the proof of Lemma 9 is that the total additional detrimental change
in spending when pi is updated is given by (28), and it increases the potential by at most (1 −
α)wi|∆ipi|.
The prior offsetting reduction in the potential by Ii = wi|∆ipi| continues to hold, so there is a
net reduction by at least αIi.
The resulting change to the overall analysis is that the reductions to the potential by α1wi|∆ipi|,
which drive the prior analysis, now become αα1wi|∆ipi|, resulting in a 1/α slowdown in the con-
vergence rates.
3.10.2 Ongoing α-Exchange Markets
At this point we review the standard definition of (One-Time) Exchange Markets.
The One-Time Exchange Market A market comprises two sets, goods G, with |G| = n, and
traders T , with |T | = m. The goods are assumed to be infinitely divisible. Each trader l starts
with an allocation wil of good i. Each trader j has a utility function uj(x1j , · · · , xnj) expressing
its preferences: if j prefers a basket with xij units (possibly a real number) of good i, to the
basket with yij units, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then uj(x1j , · · · , xnj) > uj(y1j, · · · , ynj). Each trader j
intends to trade goods so as to achieve a personal optimal combination (basket) of goods given
the constraints imposed by their initial allocation. The trade is driven by a collection of prices
pi for good i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Agent j chooses xij, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so as to maximize uj , subject to the
basket being affordable, that is:
∑n
i=1 xijpi ≤
∑n
i=1 wijpi. Prices p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) are said
to provide an equilibrium if, in addition, the demand for each good is bounded by the supply:∑m
j=1 xij ≤
∑m
j=1wij . The market problem is to find equilibrium prices.
We consider Exchange markets which repeat on a daily basis in the same way as the ongoing
Fisher markets. For each good, there will be an agent with a warehouse for that good and this
trader is the one who meets demand fluctuations from the warehouse stock.
More specifically, each day there is a collection of identical traders who come to market each
with the same basket of goods, including money, to trade. Furthermore, for each good, there is
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a trader with a warehouse, who is the price-setter for that good and whose goal is to bring the
warehouse to being half full.
We further assume that the price-setter for good i brings at least αwi of good i to the market
and is only seeking money for this portion of the supply.
We call this an α-Exchange market.
Then in the same way as for Lemma 53, one can show:
Lemma 54. In an α-Exchange market Property 1 holds.
Again, we obtain convergence slowed down by an α factor.
In [11] a related constraint on the buyer side was used. It specified that at equilibrium, traders
coming to market with money (buyers), would be buying at least αwi of the ith good, for each i.
To ensure adequate demand among buyers for goods at other prices, they introduced an additional
assumption, termed the wealth effect. This assumption was a bound on the elasticity of wealth,
namely that when all prices dropped by a factor f , all demands increased by a factor fβ for some
β, 0 < β < 1.
It would be interesting to consider a version of the ongoing exchange market in which the
price-setter only meets bounded fluctuations in demand, and demands beyond this range, along
with unspent money, are carried forward to the next day. The challenge, with respect to our
approach for the analysis, is to ensure a relatively small change in the computed demands for the
preponderance of the goods (in terms of their contribution to a suitable potential) for otherwise it
is not clear that the price updates will reduce the potential. By computed demands, we have in
mind something analogous to the calculations used in the ongoing Fisher market with warehouses:
this gives a low weight (a factor α2κ) to the demand contribution used to account for the warehouse
excesses.
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